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Security Council

Distr.: General
13 June 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 13 June 2017 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

I have the honour to transmit herewith the third report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues, which covers the period from 23 December 2016 to 12 June 2017.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sebastiano **Cardi**
Security Council Facilitator for the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

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Report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues

1. This is the third report of the Joint Commission, established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues. It provides an overview of the work undertaken by the Procurement Working Group from 23 December 2016 to 12 June 2017.

2. The Procurement Working Group comprises the States that are participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with a designated representative of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy serving as Coordinator.

3. The Procurement Working Group held seven meetings. Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency participated as observers in one of the meetings. The Procurement Working Group reviewed 10 proposals from three States: 5 were recommended for approval, 1 was withdrawn and the other 4 remain under review.

4. Documents relating to the work of the Procurement Working Group as endorsed by the Joint Commission are publicly available, including through the Security Council website dedicated to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

5. The participants in the Procurement Working Group continued to engage with Member States to raise awareness of the procurement channel process and to explain the role and objectives of the Procurement Working Group. The Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group also addressed representatives of the Security Council on 17 March on the procurement channel process.

United Nations S/2017/496

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 June 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 12 June 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, together with the communiqué of the 689th meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council, held on 30 May 2017, and the report of the African Union on the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 2320 (2016) on United Nations-assessed contributions for African Union-led peace operations authorized by the Security Council (see annex). As requested in resolution 2320 (2016), the report provides an update to the Council on: (a) the details of the proposed scope of the peace operations to be considered; (b) the progress, benchmarks and timelines for implementation of the Peace Fund of the African Union; and (c) the accountability, transparency and compliance frameworks for African Union peace support operations.

I would be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

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Annex

Letter dated 6 June 2017 from the Chairperson of the African Union addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to you with regard to our joint efforts to enhance the strategic partnership between our two organizations, particularly on the use of United Nations assessed contributions to support African Union mandated or authorized peace support operations that are also authorized by the United Nations Security Council.

As you are aware, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2320 (2016) on 18 November 2016. In that resolution, the Council expressed, for the first time, its readiness to consider the proposals of the African Union for future authorization and support by the United Nations for African Union peace support operations authorized by the Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. To that end, the Council invited the African Union to update it on three key issues: (a) the details of the proposed scope of peace operations to be considered; (b) the progress, benchmarks and timelines for implementation of the Peace Fund of the African Union; and (c) the accountability, transparency and compliance frameworks for African Union peace support operations.

I would like to commend the work undertaken by the United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission to follow up on the relevant provisions of resolution 2320, particularly the consultative process undertaken between March and April 2017. I am pleased to note that this consultative process was conducted in the spirit of true partnership and collaboration and I look forward to seeing more processes of this nature between our two organizations.

I wish to forward to you, herewith attached, the communiqué of the 689th meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 30 May 2017, by which the Peace and Security Council adopted my report on paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 2320 (2016). I am looking forward to working with you towards securing a substantive Council resolution on these issues in 2017.

(*Signed*) Moussa **Faki Mahamat**

Enclosure I

[Original: English and French]

Communiqué of the 689th meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council, held on 30 May 2017

The Peace and Security Council (PSC/Council) of the African Union (AU), at its 689th meeting held on 30 May 2017, adopted the following decision on the AU Peace Fund and the Partnership between the AU and the United Nations (UN) with respect to predictable financing of AU peace and security activities.

Council,

1. **Takes note** of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the AU Peace Fund: *Implementing an Enhanced Governance and Accountability Framework*, as well as of the *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Relevant Provisions of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2320 (2016) on UN Assessed Contributions for AU mandated or authorised Peace Support Operations (PSOs) authorised by the UN Security Council* and the briefing by the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund and the Financing of the Union;

2. **Welcomes** the statements made by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and that of the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund and the Financing of the Union and **commends** the AU High Representative and the Commission for the high quality of the reports and the work undertaken so far with regard to the Peace Fund;

3. **Recalls** its earlier decisions on the partnership between the AU and the UN in the area of peace and security, including the financing of AU mandated or authorised PSOs undertaken with the authorisation of the UN Security Council, in particular Communiqué PSC/PR/Comm.(CLXXVIII) and Press Statement PSC/PR/BR.2(CCVII), adopted at its 178th and 206th meetings on 13 March and 15 October 2009, respectively, as well as Communiqués PSC/PR/Comm.(CCCVII) and PSC/AHG/Comm/1.(CCCXCVII) adopted at its 307th and 397th meetings held on 9 January 2012 and 23 September 2013 and Press Statement PSC/PR/BR.(DXXXII) adopted at its 532nd meeting held on 10 August 2015;

4. **Further recalls** Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM/2(DXLVII) adopted at its 547th meeting held in New York on 26 September 2015, which welcomed the modalities proposed by the Chairperson of the Commission on the follow up steps on the Common African Position on the Review of UN Peace Operations [PSC/AHG/3. (DXLVII)], for the provision of UN assessed contributions to AU mandated or authorised PSOs, and agreed that the operationalization of the proposed arrangements for the financing of AU-led peace support operations

undertaken with the authorisation of the UN Security Council should be predicated on the following:

i. African ownership, as a key factor to the success of peace efforts on the continent;

ii. reaffirmation of the primary role of the UN Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, and of the role of regional arrangements as elaborated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter;

iii. acknowledgment that support by the UN to regional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security is an integral part of collective security as provided for in the UN Charter;

iv. enhanced strategic partnership with the UN, including the development of a framework outlining the steps necessary to activate authorization by the UN Security Council of AU-led missions to be supported by UN assessed contributions;

v. strengthening of the AU's capacity to plan and manage PSOs;

vi. enhancement of AU financial oversight mechanisms; and

vii. strengthening of the AU's Human Rights Due Diligence capabilities, including preventing and combating sexual exploitation and abuses in AU-led peace support operations;

5. **Reiterates** its commitment, in line with the relevant provisions of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, to the partnership with the UN based on the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security and the role of regional arrangements as provided for in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and in accordance with the principles of comparative advantage, division of labour, burden-sharing and consultative decision-making. In this respect, Council **stresses, once aga.n,** that support by the UN to regional organisations in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security is an integral part of collective security as provided for in the UN Charter;

6. **Reaffirms** that adherence to the principle of African ownership and priority-setting for the continent's peace and security agenda is critical for the successful promotion of lasting peace, security and stability in Africa. In this respect, Council **underscores the importance** of the decisions of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the financing of the AU peace and security agenda as part of the overall financing of the Union, including

Decisions Assembly/AU/Dec561(XXIV) and Assembly/AU/Dec.577(XXV) adopted by the 24th and 25th Ordinary Sessions of the Assembly of the Union, held in January and June 2015, in Addis Ababa and Johannesburg, respectively, by which Member States agreed to contribute 25% of the AU peace and security efforts, including peace support operations, and Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII) on the financing of the Union adopted by the 27th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union held in July 2016 in Kigali, which decided to endow the AU Peace Fund with $400m by 2020 with financing raised from AU Member States.

7. **Recalls** resolutions 1809 (2007), 2033(2012) and 2167 (2014), as well as presidential statement PRST/2014/27, in which the UN Security Council, *inter alia*: (a) expressed its determination to take effective steps to further enhance the relationship between the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations, in particular the AU, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, (b) reiterated that the growing contribution made by regional and sub-regional organizations can usefully complement the work of the UN in maintaining international peace and security, and that cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations and consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter can improve collective security, and (c) stressed the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organizations when they undertake peacekeeping under a UN mandate;

8. **Welcomes** UN Security Council Resolution 2320 (2016) which acknowledged the need for more support to enhance AU PSOs and encouraged further dialogue between the UN and AU to this end; stressed the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led PSOs authorized by the Security Council; and expressed the Security Council's readiness to consider the proposals of the AU, for future authorization and support by the Security Council for AU PSOs authorized by the Security Council and under the Security Council's authority under Chapter VIII of the Charter, including on financing and accountability;

9. **Commends** the work undertaken by the Commission and the UN Secretariat to follow up on the relevant provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2320 (2016), particularly the consultative process undertaken between March and April 2017;

10. **Endorses** the Enhanced Governance and Accountability Framework of the Peace Fund and the management structure, the proposed eligibility criteria and fund management principles as recommended in the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission, taking into consideration representation of AU Member States in the governing structures of the Peace Fund, based on regional representation and the modalities to implement it, in addition to the operating costs of the Fund, and **requests** the Commission to expedite the full operationalization of the Peace Fund Governance and Management Arrangements, in consultation with relevant AU Organs;

11. **Adopts** the report submitted by the Chairperson of the Commission with respect to the three issues identified by the Security Council in paragraph 7 of UNSCR 2320, namely, (a) details of the proposed scope of PSOs to be considered; (b) the progress, benchmarks, and timelines for implementation of the AU Peace Fund, and (c) accountability, transparency, and compliance frameworks for AU PSOs, as a basis for operationalising the financing arrangements. Council **urges** the UN, in close consultation with the AU, to establish financing and mission support models that are fit for purpose and adapted to the requirements of each type of operation;

a. Scope of Operations: In the same way that the UNSC will take decisions on support to AU PSOs on a case-by-case basis, the PSC will equally decide, on a case-by-case basis, which operations it would request UN support through assessed contributions. The Chairperson's report identifies four broad types of operations that the AU is likely to mandate or authorize. These should not be read as a pre-defined list, or preclude the possibility of the emergence of new trends and types of operations based on an evolving security context:

i. *Observer Missions;*

ii. *Preventive Deployment and Peace Enforcement Missions* implemented by the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs) for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution or a coalition of Member States;

iii. *Stabilization Missions following Peace Enforcement Missions* implemented by the AU or RECs/RMs. The AU envisages a limited bridging stabilization role, focused on multi-dimensional tasks within its comparative advantage, in the period immediately following peace enforcement operations and in advance of the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Operation;

iv. *Missions and Security Initiatives in response to complex national/transnational security threats implemented by the AU, RECs/RMs or coalitions of Member States.*

b. Progress, benchmarks, and timelines for implementation of the AU Peace Fund: Council **urges** for the swift operationalisation of the remaining elements of the Peace Fund implementation milestones, in line with the timelines set out in the Chairperson's report.

c. Adherence to International Humanitarian Law, Human rights, Conduct and Discipline in the conduct of PSOs: Council **emphasizes** the importance of compliance in these areas, as it goes to the heart of the effectiveness, legitimacy and credibility of the deployment of AU mandated or authorized PSOs. Council **further requests** regular

reporting on the implementation of the work plan and an annual report on compliance in on-going AU mandated or authorized PSOs.

12. **Requests** the Security Council, on the basis of the above and the UN Secretary-General's Report on options for authorization and support for AU PSOs, to take practical steps towards the adoption of a substantive Resolution that establishes the principle that AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UN Security Council should be financed through UN assessed contributions, with decisions on the financing of specific missions to be taken on a case by case basis;

13. **Welcomes** the expansion of the mandate of the High Representative for the Peace Fund and **encourages** him to undertake sustained bilateral engagements with Member States to expedite the endowment of the Peace Fund in line with the Kigali Decision;

14. **Underlines** the critical role to be played by the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3) in advancing AU Peace and Security Agenda at the UN level , in particular with regard to reaching a substantive resolution on the use of UN assessed contributions to support AU mandated or authorised PSOs;

15. **Requests** the Chairperson of the Commission, to follow up on the various aspects of this communiqué, in particular the development of an overall implementation plan for the proposals contained in his report to Council, including areas for joint action with the UN where appropriate, and the establishment, within the Commission, of an inter-departmental follow up structure that will periodically report to Council through the Chairperson;

16. **Commends** Member States that have already made their contributions to the Peace Fund and **appeals** to all other AU Member States that have not yet done so, to take the necessary steps to expedite the payment of their annual contributions to the Peace Fund. Council **reiterates its conviction** that African ownership with regard to the AU Peace and Security Agenda is only possible, if Member States assume their share of the common burden in efforts towards promoting peace, security and stability in the continent;

17. **Requests** the Chairperson of the Commission and his High Representative to take forward the political engagement with United Nations and relevant partners towards securing a substantive UNSC resolution on these issues in 2017. Council **further requests** the Chairperson of the Commission to transmit this Communiqué and his Report on the Relevant Provisions of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2320 (2016) on UN Assessed Contributions for AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UN Security Council to the UN Secretary-General for onward transmission to the UN Security Council, for its consideration and action as appropriate;

18. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

Enclosure II

Report on the relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 2320 (2016) on United Nations assessed contributions for African Union-led peace operations authorized by the Security Council

Key References

A. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (2002);
B. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1809 on predictable and sustainable financing for AU Peace Operations authorised by the UN Security Council;
C. Report of the AU-UN Panel on Financing African Peacekeeping Missions (Prodi Panel, 2008);
D. 24th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly Decision on Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union Assembly/AU/Dec.561(XXIV) (2015);
E. Common African Position on the United Nations Review of Peace Support Operations (2015);
F. Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) (2016);
G. Joint African Union–United Nations Review of available mechanisms to finance and support African Union peace support operations authorized by the United Nations Security Council (2016);
H. African Union High Representative for the Peace Fund's Report on Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace and Security in Africa (2016)
I. 27th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly Decision on Decision on the Outcome of the Retreat of the Heads of States and Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Finance on the Financing of the African Union (2016)
J. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2320 (2016)

List of Annexes

- Annex 1: List of Peace Support Operations in Africa (2003 to Date);
- Annex 2: AU Human Rights and Conduct and Discipline Framework (2017) from Legal Obligations to Implementing Mechanisms.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report constitutes the update requested from the African Union (AU) by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016. UNSCR 2320, welcomed the AU's request to start

discussions on "the provision of UN assessed contributions for AU-led peace operations authorized by the Security Council".

2. In the resolution, the UNSC invited the AU to update the Security Council by May 2017, on three key issues: (a) the details of the proposed scope of peace operations to be considered; (b) the progress, benchmarks, and timelines for implementation of the AU Peace Fund, and (c) the accountability, transparency, and compliance frameworks for AU peace support operations.

3. In order to address these three questions, this report:

a) Provides a brief overview of the current security context and the evolution of Peace Support Operations in Africa in order to address the question of the 'scope of operations';

b) Summarises the various political, institutional and operational lessons that have been learned in the deployment of AU PSOs that will inform the approach to strengthening the effectiveness of AU PSOs; and

c) Outlines the AU's key priorities for strengthening the overall effectiveness, management and oversight of AU PSOs. These include: securing predictable PSO financing within the framework of the Peace Fund, strengthening AU PSO planning and management capacities, strengthening the AU's PSO partnership with the UN, and establishing a robust accountability and compliance framework for AU PSOs.

II. BACKGROUND

4. It is a well-established fact that strengthening the African Union's (AU) comparative advantage in responding rapidly to some of the most complex and challenging crises can only enhance the overall credibility and effectiveness of the international peace and security architecture.

5. Yet, the financing of AU mandated or authorized peace support operations (AU PSOs) in a predictable and sustainable manner remains one of the most important strategic challenges facing the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN).

6. In 2015, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)[1] called for stronger partnerships emphasizing that a more resilient global and regional architecture for international peace and security is

[1] A/70/95-S/2015/446

required for the future. It called on the United Nations to lay out a vision for such partnerships and to help enable others. In this respect, the HIPPO report noted that:

7. The UN's regional *partnerships in Africa must be intensified and made more predictable through mechanisms for collaboration and by optimizing the use of limited resources. This is a partnership that should be made deeper and more collaborative. The UN should take the decisive step to invest in and commit to the success of the African Union as a partner in addressing shared concerns.*

8. The Panel went on to recommend that: *UN Assessed contributions be provided on a case-by case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the African Union and/or African Member States.*

9. This is in line with Article 17(1) of *the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council* (the PSC Protocol) which cites Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as the basis of its relationship with the UN. The PSC Protocol directs the PSC to cooperate with the UNSC, "...which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."

10. In a direct reference to burden-sharing, Article 17(2) of the PSC Protocol states that: "Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union's activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter".

11. The UN Secretary-General's 2015 report on the Future of United Nations peace operations[2], prioritized the need to put in place a global-regional framework to manage today's peace and security challenges – stating that this should start with *a reinforced partnership between the United Nations and the African Union.*

12. Over the past two years significant progress has been made in addressing predictable and sustainable financing for AU PSOs:

July 2016 AU Assembly Financing Decision (Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII)

13. In 2015, the Assembly of African Union Heads of State and Government decided to finance 25% of the AU's peace support operations budget. In January 2016, the Chairperson of the AU Commission appointed

[2] A/70/357-S/2015/682

Dr. Donald Kaberuka, former President of the African Development Bank, as her High Representative for the Peace Fund. A key element of the High Representative's mandate was to develop a credible roadmap for financing the 25% of the AU PSO budget by the year 2020.

14. The High Representative submitted a Progress Report to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Retreat on the Financing of the Union on the margins of the 27th Ordinary Session of the AU Summit held in July 2016 in Kigali, with proposals on how to finance the African Union as a whole and reinvigorate the Peace Fund.

15. Based on this report, the AU Assembly decided to institute a universal levy of 0.2% on eligible imports to finance the African Union. The decision included provisions to reinvigorate the Peace Fund and appropriately endow it with up to $400m by 2020 to finance preventive diplomacy, mediation activities, build critical institutional capabilities, finance 25% of the AU peace support operations budget and maintain a Crisis Reserve Facility.

Joint African Union–United Nations Review of available mechanisms to finance and support African Union peace support operations authorized by the United Nations Security Council

16. In July 2015[3], following a UN lessons learned study on transitions from AU peace support operations to UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and Central African Republic, the UN Secretary-General proposed that the UN and AU undertake a joint UN-AU Review on available mechanisms to support to AU PSOs. The Joint Review was an opportunity to advance the goal of improving the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for AU PSOs.

17. The August 2016 Joint Review concluded that the AU is an effective first responder and that access to the United Nations assessed contributions has provided a reliable, predictable and sustainable means of financing support requirements for African Union peace support operations.

18. The Joint review was subsequently endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in September 2015, while the United Nations Security Council took note of the report with appreciation in November 2016.

[3] S/2015/3

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2320

19. On 18 November 2016, following a briefing by the AU Commission and the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), UNSCR 2320 was unanimously adopted. UNSCR 2320 welcomed the July 2016 AU Assembly Decision and in it the UNSC expressed, for the first time, its readiness to consider the AU's proposals for future authorization and support by the Security Council for AU peace support operations authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

20. The 2016 AU Assembly Financing Decision on the Peace Fund and UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2320, signal a shift towards a new phase of AU-UN partnership that must move beyond statements of principle and towards a partnership that delivers real improvements in the overall predictability, sustainability and effectiveness of AU PSOs.

21. In this phase, attention must now turn to (a) how to operationalize the AU-UN partnership principles articulated in the Common African Position giving practical effect to the spirit of 'comparative advantage', and (b) how to strengthen and align AU and UN institutional policy and practice to address existing and future PSO partnership challenges. There is enough collective experience and a range of lessons to draw on from the past decade of AU-UN partnership to inform this process.

III. THE SECURITY CONTEXT IN AFRICA

22. There has been considerable progress in consolidating peace and security in Africa over the past decade. Nonetheless, a number of structural drivers of conflict still remain, making the continent vulnerable to violent conflict and insecurity.

23. While the number of armed conflicts between and among states has reduced, armed conflicts between state and non-state rebel and insurgent groups remain a key feature of crises in Africa. This pattern of armed conflict is often rooted in a complex and interrelated set of political, economic, social and environmental root causes involving the use of a combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare. The adverse consequences for civilian populations due to deliberate targeting by some forces, humanitarian crises, the circulation of light arms across regions, displacements and the proliferation of refugees to neighboring countries and beyond, are some of the enduring manifestations of these conflicts.

24. Africa's security landscape has been further challenged by the rise of transnational threats. These crises transcend national boundaries and have regional and international consequences. They include organized

crime, environmental conflicts, terrorism and health pandemics amongst others. They are not necessarily rooted in the same historical causes but have, in some cases, similar general characteristics in terms of actors, patterns of violence, and prospects for political settlement.

25. Today, the non-state actors involved are diverse, ranging from criminal networks to rebel groups and terrorists, criminal gangs, traffickers and armed groups or militia. Groups such as the M-23 in the Great Lakes; Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Mourabitoune in the Sahel-Sahara region, the Islamic State (ISIS) in Libya and some countries in the North Africa, Al Shaabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the East and Central African regions fall within some of these categories. The deliberate targeting of civilians through asymmetric warfare is also an increasingly common feature.

26. Against this backdrop, and in response to the most serious threats to peace and security, the deployment of AU mandated or authorized Peace Support Operations (AU PSOs) will remain a key requirement.

27. Given the enduring traditional and evolving contemporary security challenges outlined above, the effectiveness of AU PSOs is directly dependent on our collective ability to deliver more effective regional and international responses based on enhanced strategic partnerships, collaborative action, and our respective institutional comparative advantages.

IV. EVOLUTION OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

28. The African Union's (AU) institutional experience in deploying PSOs dates back to the Organization for African Unity (OAU). However, it was after the creation of the AU in 2002, that the deployment of PSOs and regional security initiatives by the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) as well as coalitions of states in response to crises, gained prominence.

29. This is in part a reflection of the legal instruments, and institutional arrangements put in place by the AU within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). As such, the AU's Constitutive Act, and the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (PSC Protocol) have significantly contributed in strengthening the mandate and powers of the AU in relation to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

30. The AU has mandated or authorized thirteen (13) PSOs since 2003. These have ranged from observer and political missions, to complex

multidimensional and counterterrorism operations. Regional blocs such as the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have also deployed PSOs, as observed in the Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau and most recently in The Gambia. Annex 1 provides a summary of PSOs mandated or authorized by the AU PSC as well as those deployed by the RECs/RMs.

31. The types of operations and missions mandated or authorized by the OAU/AU can be classified into seven categories. Some of these categories are not mutually exclusive. These illustrate the evolution of the AU's own institutional experience and its relationship with the United Nations (UN):

a) *The first category:* These cover classic Observer missions are deployed in the case of conflicts that have not reached a level of severity that they pose an immediate threat to regional or international peace and security. In these situations, the presence of a third party in the form of an Observer mission can help de-escalate tensions and contribute to generating the basic confidence-building conditions required for a follow-on political settlement or the implementation of an existing agreement. The various operations carried out in the Comoros (Observer Mission of the OAU in the Comoros MIOC I in 1997, as well as MIOC II and MIOC III in 2002) fall within this framework. Other cases, also include the OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB in 1993), as well as the AU Mission deployed in South Sudan, from 2007 to monitor the implementation of the 2006 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, between the Ugandan government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

b) *The second category:* relates to situations in which the AU acts as 'first responder' and launches a PSO, based on its ability to deploy swiftly and pending the deployment of the UN. These missions are typically complex multidimensional operations comprising, of civilian, police and military components. Their range of responsibilities often span from peace enforcement operations to the initial stages of stabilization operations aimed at supporting national authorities in the maintenance of territorial integrity as well as restoration and extension of state authority, to the protection of civilians. In all these cases, the AU needs to rapidly identify and deploy significant personnel, as well as mobilize complex logistics support packages and substantial funding. The AU Missions deployed in Burundi (AMIB 2003), Darfur (AMIS in 2004), Somalia (AMISOM since 2007), in Mali (AFISMA in 2013) and in the Central African Republic (MISCA, end 2013) fall into this category.

c) *The third category:* This covers situations in which the UN is unable to undertake the mission tasks envisaged, on the grounds that these tasks fall outside their traditional peacekeeping mandate. This was the case, for example, in Burundi in 2006, where the United Nations considered that ensuring the safety of political leaders was not in their mandate. The AU had therefore had to appeal to South Africa to constitute a Special Protection Force to undertake this task as part of AMIB's existing mandate.

d) *The fourth category:* relates to missions which involve a deliberate use of force in the context of deployments undertaken pursuant to Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act of the Union. These represent cases for which it may not be easy to mobilize the political will required at the international level. In these circumstances, and in the absence of any international consensus/action, the AU may decide to act on its own. The intervention "Democracy in the Comoros", in 2008, exemplifies this case. The objective of the operation was to support the efforts of the Government of the Comoros in restoring its authority on the Anjouan Island. The initial attempt to deploy an African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) under Article 4(h), in January 2016, is also an example of this category.

e) *The fifth category:* relates to situations in which the AU co-deploys a mission alongside a UN mission. This occured in 2000, with the AU Observers and Liaison Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (OLMEE). The objective was to demonstrate a close partnership between the AU and the UN in the implementation of the peace process. Significantly, it was explicitly stated in the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of June 2000 that the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) would be deployed under the auspices of the OAU.

f) *The sixth category:* The AU/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur was established in this form because the Government of Sudan was only willing to accept an AU/UN hybrid Mission on its territory. Indeed, for various complex reasons related to domestic policy and/or history, some countries may be reluctant to accept the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. In this case, the AU's engagement provided the requisite legitimacy to the international effort. Some observers believe that the hybrid form offers new perspectives to meet the challenges of peace, and that the international community would benefit from building on this experience.

g) *The seventh category*: reflects a growing trend. It relates to threats and low intensity conflicts that have the potential to escalate into violent confrontations between national defense and security forces and transnational criminal and/or terrorist groups. The Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA (RCI-LRA), deployed since 2011 under a PSC mandate and involving countries directly affected by the LRA, is one example of this sort of action. In a similar vein, the PSC requested the Commission, in 2012, to support the member countries of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in their initial planning to deploy a regional Neutral Intervention Force (NIF) against the M23 and other "negative forces" in north and south Kivu, Eastern DRC. Follow-on discussions with the UN led to the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) currently deployed as part of MONUSCO. More recently, in 2015, at the request of Member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the Benin, the AUC helped coordinate the strategic and operational levels planning for a regional counter-terrorism mission and the PSC authorized the deployment of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat the Boko Haram terrorist group. The AU is responsible for the strategic direction and resource mobilization aspect of this operation, as well its political oversight.

V. SCOPE OF OPERATIONS

32. On the 18 November 2016, the UN Security Council through its Resolution (UNSCR) 2320, invited the AU to update the UN Security Council on the *'detail of the proposed scope of operations to be considered'* for support from UN Assessed Contributions to AU mandated or authorized PSOs with a Security Council mandate.

33. In the same way that the UNSC will take decisions on support to AU PSOs on a case-by-case basis, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) will also decide on a case-by-case basis which operations it intends to request UN support through assessed contributions. It is clear that UN support through assessed contributions may not be required in some instances.

34. What is, therefore, more important is the following:

a) Having clarity on the types of operations that the AU or other sub-regional bodies with conflict prevention, resolution and management mandates are likely to undertake,

b) Establishing financing, mission planning, management, support and compliance models, that are fit for purpose and adapted to the requirements of each type of operation,

c) Putting in place the appropriate partnership and mutual accountability frameworks, and

d) Ensuring that consultative planning and decision-making takes place in a timely and predictable way.

35. Rather than pre-defining a particular 'scope of operations', this section focuses on the 'types of operations' that the AU is likely to mandate or authorize.

36. The historical account presented in section IV above shows the rapid evolution of a set of innovative and dynamic PSO capacities that the OAU/AU has developed through a variety of operations. Based on this, the following **four broad types of operations** have been identified (with the provision that these do not preclude the possibility of the emergence of new trends and types of operations based on an evolving security context):

A. *Observer Missions*

i) AU or Regional Security Advisory Support to an AU Political Mission.

ii) AU or Regional Observer/Political Mission operating alongside a UN Mission.

iii) AU or Regional Observer/Political Mission co-deployed with a UN mission (e.g. category 5 above).

iv) Stand-alone AU or Regional Observer Mission.

B. *Preventive Deployment and Peace Enforcement Missions*

i) AU or Regional Preventive Deployment Missions, which would prioritise tasks depending on the context and requirements.

ii) Peace Enforcement Missions mandated and implemented by the AU.

iii) Peace Enforcement Missions mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or Regional Mechanisms (RMs) for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

iv) Peace Enforcement Missions mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by a coalition of Member States.

v) Peace Enforcement Missions mandated or authorized by the AU, operating alongside other national forces under a UN mandate.

vi) Peace Enforcement Missions mandated or authorized by the AU, operating alongside a UN Mission.

C. *Stabilization Missions following Peace Enforcement Missions*

37. The AU envisages a limited bridging stabilization role, focused on multi-dimensional tasks within its comparative advantage, in the period immediately following peace enforcement operations and in advance of the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Operation.

i) Stabilization Missions mandated and implemented by the AU.

ii) Stabilization Missions mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by RECs or RMs.

D. *Missions and Security Initiatives in response to complex national/transnational security threats*

i) Regional Security Initiatives mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by RECs or RMs.

ii) Security Initiatives mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by a coalition of Member States.

iii) Security Initiatives mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by a coalition of Member States and operating alongside a UN Mission.

iv) Security Initiatives mandated and implemented by the AU and operating alongside a UN Mission.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED

38. This section highlights some of the key issues that will need to be addressed as part of the process of strengthening the overall effectiveness, management and oversight of AU PSOs. Many of these issues were highlighted in the Joint AU/UN Review of available mechanisms to support AU PSOs.

39. **At the political level**

a) *Improving coordination of international actions and initiatives*: Crisis situations often become the "scene" for a plurality of interventions by various actors, each more eager than the other to assist in the search for a solution. Yet, the absence of a common approach based on shared analysis and coordination contributes to further complicating already complex situations and results in dispersed efforts and limited overall impact. The AU and the United Nations have drawn lessons from some of the mistakes made, for example, during the transition process from the AFISMA to MINUSMA in Mali. In other cases, the lessons have still not been learned, e.g. Somalia where the proliferation of numerous unco-

ordinated bilateral military training and equipment programmes remains a significant challenge and limits the prospects of a successful AMISOM exit.

b) *Maintaining coherence of action within the framework of "Subsidiarity"*: Typically, RECs and RMs are the first line of response to crises. Yet their actions must necessarily fit within a broader continental and international framework. This has sometimes proven challenging. For example, in the case of AFISMA, in Mali, planning had been initiated by ECOWAS in April 2012, without real involvement of the AU or the UN. It is only as a result of the October 2012 UNSCR 2071 that the AU and the UN became involved in the process. It was subsequently difficult to determine which organization (ECOWAS, the AU or the United Nations) would take the lead in planning. Efforts are underway to improve the co-ordination of planning, decision-making and strategic management issues between the AU and RECs/RMs. This will in turn lead to improved co-ordination and planning between the AU and the UN.

40. **At the institutional level**

a) *Ensuring predictable and sustainable financing for AU PSOs*: There is general agreement that the current financing arrangements for peace support operations are neither reliable nor predictable, especially in the context of missions/operations deployed in highly volatile threat environments. While partners have, over the years, demonstrated much flexibility and innovation, there is consensus that the current AU financing arrangements are unsustainable.

b) *Adapting the AU's Financial and Administrative rules and procedures to PSO requirements*: The AU's experience in deploying PSOs has highlighted the need to review the existing administrative and financial procedures (disbursement of funds, recruitment, procurement, facility management etc.). The complex requirements of PSOs calls for greater flexibility while ensuring accountability at different levels. The current AUC procedures allow limited freedom of action to respond to crises in a timely manner in rapidly evolving and difficult environments.

c) *Strengthening strategic mission planning and management capacity:* The proper management of PSOs requires reinforced capacity at the AUC level. Almost all AU missions have suffered from this lack of dedicated capacity and the AU has typically had to rely on ad hoc structures financed by international partners. These include the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), in 2004, for AMIS

in Sudan and the Strategic Planning and Management Unit for Somalia (SPMU), in 2007 with regard to AMISOM.

d) *Strengthening capacity to operationalize the AU framework on integrating human rights and IHL in AU PSO and support compliance:* The AU/UN Joint Review noted the progress that the AU had made in implementing a compliance framework but also identified the lack of dedicated capacity in this area as a challenge. Since the publication of the AU/UN Joint Review there has been progress in reinforcing staff capacity at the AUC level, but additional resources will be required to fully operationalize the compliance framework.

41. **At operational level**

a) *Strengthening the preparation and operational readiness of contingents availed by Troops and Police Contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs):* It is not unusual to see contingents being deployed to the mission, particularly in the critical phase of the first entry of the Force into the theatre, without having received the adequate training, or the individual and collective equipment necessary to fulfil their mission. The operational readiness of TCC/PCC contingents must be significantly improved and closely monitored, including through standby arrangements. This should also take into account the readiness of troops from a human rights perspective. Strengthening the effectiveness of pre-deployment verification and visits is also a key aspect of addressing these issues.

b) *Ensuring the timely establishment of the Headquarters at all levels:* The lack of infrastructure dedicated to the establishment of Headquarters at the mission and sector levels which results in slow deployments into the mission's sectors. There is also a lack of harmonized Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), particularly in the areas of operational communications and administration. The lack of readily deployable and usable operational HQ modules (infrastructure and communications), is a clear handicap for interventions by the AU and sub-regional organizations.

c) *Ensuring timely production and dissemination of key mission documents:* Strategic guiding documents, including the Directives to the Heads of Mission and those to the Heads of components are sometimes not issued on time to the mission. Such delays can contribute to a lack of clarity in the command, control and management of the mission. In some cases, many of the key

strategic documents are not available in the appropriate mission language.

d) *Strengthening command, control and co-ordination of the mission*: the chalienges exist at two levels. First, it is essential that the AU and the RECs/RMs agree on a coherent command and co-ordination system, as well as a clearly defined management structure for missions. In the case of AFISMA in Mali, even though the Special Representative of the Chairperson of AU Commission was theoretically entrusted with the functions of the Head of the Mission, it was difficult for him to practically exercise direct authority over the military and police components, which were in reality receiving their support and instructions from ECOWAS. Second, Similar command and co-ordination challenges have been identified in the case of high intensity combat operations such as AMISOM and MNJTF.

e) *Strengthening information and communications infrastructure and links:* between the strategic level (AUC) and the mission HQs, as well as between the Heads of components (Force Commander, Police Commissioner. Limited information and communications capabilities often handicap effective command, management and control of the mission particularly at the mission start up phase.

f) *Harmonizing management procedures*: The absence of harmonized management procedures between the AU and the RECs/RMs is often a real handicap. The mission components are sometimes managed in a differentiated way, which can permit neither an optimization nor a pooling of means, nor an effective management and control. In the case of AFISMA, there was the added challenge that the Mission had three different sources of funding (an AU Trust Fund, a UN Trust Fund and ECOWAS funding) that were not coordinated and as a result operating costs were duplicated. An accountability mechanism for all these funds was not defined.

g) *Strengthening logistical support*: Inadequate logistical support often handicaps AU missions. In some cases, logistical support has been provided in an erratic and incomplete manner by the TCCs themselves with the support of bilateral partners. The medical support is often problematic, and has proven particularly deficient with respect to medical treatment and evacuations. Supplies (rations, water and stationary) to the troops at contingent level remain major challenges during the life-span of most missions. The case of MISCA is a typical example where proper supply chain management proved particularly difficult for the mission to handle.

h) *Timely deployment of air transportation assets:* The absence of predictable strategic airlift capabilities as well as that of in-theater air assets is also a serious limiting factor for rapid deployment and re-deployment, quick reaction, as well as logistics support and other in-theater movements. These critical enablers are at the heart of any PSOs success. Their absence emanates from the overall lack of predictable funding and, in cases where funding does exist, the highly caveated nature of partner support.

i) *Timely deployment of effective HR/IHL risk management and compliance mechanisms/capacities:* In order to be effective, it is imperative that these capacities are systematically factored into the mission start-up phase, adequately resourced and well integrated into the mission level structures.

VII. STRENGTHENING THE PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF AU MANDATED/ AUTHORIZED PSOS

42. Strengthening the performance and effectiveness of AU PSOs is a global strategic imperative, given the complex and interconnected nature of threats to collective peace and security. It is also a key part of creating a more responsive international peace and security architecture. Sections IV and V of this report illustrate the key roles the AU, RECs, RMs and AU Member States have played in taking the lead in confronting challenges that other institutions are not able to address.

43. AU PSOs have a unique comparative advantage in their ability to act as 'first responder' often, but not exclusively, in situations where the conditions for peacekeeping are not yet achieved. In some of these contexts, the subsequent deployment of a UN operation often provides the exit strategy for the AU. In these cases, identifying the key objective criteria and benchmarks to be attained by an AU PSO at the very early stage of its planning and deployment and creating the right conditions for a smooth transition is absolutely critical. The lessons of the transitions from AFISMA to MINUSMA in Mali in 2013 and from MISCA to MINUSCA in CAR in 2015 have highlighted the dangers of pursuing rushed transitions.

44. There are clear lessons to show that the failure to invest in the establishment of a strong AU footprint and the achievement of key objectives during the initial phases of the deployment of a PSO, has had a direct impact on the quality and effectiveness of follow-on UN missions. In these cases, the follow-on UN missions lost considerable time and resources in consolidating and making additional gains.

45. The lessons have been identified and there is now a clear understanding that we need to develop a system of collective security adapted to the realities of the current world with a focus on preserving respective institutional comparative advantages. There have been some innovations but it is now time to move away from ad hoc interventions and find systemic solutions to today's peace and security challenges. These are complex issues, ranging from funding, to crafting new partnerships with the UN and others. They will require political will and a paradigm shift.

46. As part of this process, the AU will ensure its efforts in improving the effectiveness of AU PSOs are focused on preserving the comparative advantage of AU mandated or authorized PSOs. In practice, this will involve the following:

(i) Mobilizing and targeting its own resources on the areas that ensure AU mandated or authorized PSOs are able to maintain an effective 'first responder' role thus preserving its ownership and political credibility.

(ii) Developing Peace Fund financial and administrative rules and procedures adapted to the requirements of AU mandated or authorized PSOs while ensuring overall accountability, that enable the AU, RECs, RMs or coalitions of Member States to deliver their mandates effectively and facilitate a transition to UN mission in some cases.

(iii) Forging predictable and strategic partnerships that reinforce the comparative advantage of AU mandated or authorized PSOs.

(iv) Enhancing its planning and consultative decision-making processes with a focus on improving co-ordination with the UN and RECs/RMs so as to ensure more timely and effective joint action where this is required.

(v) Strengthening its institutional capacities and compliance framework in line with international humanitarian law, human rights and conduct and discipline requirements.

47. These five core priorities are explored in more detail below:

A. *Financing AU PSOs*

48. To address the chronic lack of financial predictability and sustainability for AU-led PSOs, in 2015, the 25th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly decided to take responsibility for 25% of PSO budget by 2020. Increasing the predictability of financing from AU Member States is expected to strengthen overall AU oversight and management of AU PSOs

and help target resources in improving critical PSO capacities such as logistics planning and supply support.

49. As part of the Progress Report of the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund to the 27th Ordinary Session, held in Kigali in July 2016, a number of scenarios, were developed to analyze the financial implications of the 2015 Assembly decision to finance 25% of the PSO budget:

Table 1: AU PSO (Peace Fund Window 3) Scenarios

	Total Cost (mil USD)	2016 5%	2017 10%	2018 15%	2019 20%	2020 25%
Baseline Scenario	1,200	49	103	163	228	299
Minimalist Scenario	236	12	25	39	55	72
Middle Scenario	772	38	81	128	179	235

50. Ultimately, it was agreed that the scenario described as "Middle Scenario" is the most realistic. This includes the Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF) and the AU Military Experts' and Human Rights Observers' Mission deployed in 2015, in Burundi. In addition, it assumes the potential deployment of two new missions, totaling 15,000 uniformed personnel. The scenario also includes a 5% adjustment for inflation over the 5-year period.

51. Under this scenario, the estimated cost of all AU PSOs in 2016 would be US$772m (the baseline on which this is determined remains an estimate).

52. In July 2016 AU Assembly also decided to institute a universal levy of 0.2% on eligible imports (Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII) to finance the African Union.

53. The Assembly decision on Financing the Union included provisions to reinvigorate the Peace Fund, structure it into three thematic windows and appropriately endow it to cover preventive diplomacy, mediation activities Window 1), build critical institutional capacities (Window 2), contribute to AU PSOs (Window 3) and maintain a Crisis Reserve Facility.

54. The 0.2% levy will endow the Peace Fund with a total of $400m by 2020 against an estimated overall Peace Fund budget of $302m in 2020. Any unutilized balances will be held in the Crisis Reserve Facility to enable rapid response to unforeseen crises.

55. A Committee of Ten Finance Ministers was established to oversee the implementation of the Kigali Financing Decision. Following two meetings, the Committee agreed that 2017 will serve as a 'transitional'

year in which countries will undertake the various national legislative and administrative measures required to implement the Kigali Decision in line with national and international obligations.

56. As part of this transition period, the 2017 (Year 1) target for the Peace Fund is $65m. Of this amount, up to $38m will be allocated to Window 3. The balance of $27m will cover Windows 1 and 2 of the Peace Fund, based on requirements and any unutilized balances will be held in the Crisis Reserve Facility.

57. By May 2017, 14 AU Member States had made their contribution to the Peace Fund. These contributions represent just over 12% of the of the target amount for 2017.

58. With respect to Window 3 of the AU Peace Fund, decisions on the specific AU PSO mission costs to finance, will be taken on a case by case basis taking into account the type, size and expected duration of the mission.

59. A Peace Fund Instrument, setting out the detailed governance arrangements and terms of reference for the Board of Trustees, Peace Fund Secretariat, Independent Fund Manager and Independent Evaluation Panel, as well as fund eligibility criteria has been developed. The target for the adoption of the Instrument in July 2017. This will be followed by the nomination of the Board of Trustees and recruitment for the various entities established under the new governance arrangements (December 2017).

60. In May 2015, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission expanded the mandate of the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund to cover the overall Financing of the Union. Under his expanded mandate the AUHR is tasked with supporting the AU and its Member States in accelerating the implementation of the Kigali Financing Decision.

B. *Strengthening the AU-UN PSO Partnership*

Comparative Advantage

61. As highlighted in the Joint AU/UN Review, it is well understood that as the nature of international peace and security threats has evolved, no single organization has the legitimacy and capabilities required to act alone. Within this context, the AU's proven ability to act as 'first responder' is a critical element of the evolving international peace and security architecture.

62. Based on this shared understanding, both the 2015 Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Support Operations (Common African Position) and the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report stressed the need for a strategic-level AU-UN partnership.

63. In line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and Articles 7 and 17 of the PSC Protocol, the Common African Position called for an enhanced form of partnership based on (a) the two organizations' respective authorities, competencies and capacities, and (b) the principles of burden-sharing, consultative decision-making, and a mutually-acceptable division of labor.

Operationalizing the AU-UN PSO partnership principles

64. Political level PSC-UNSC discussions are now required to reach final agreement on an acceptable framework for consultative decision-making and mandating in this area.

65. *Division of labor*: There is consensus that the AU plays a critical and unique role as first responder within the international architecture. The gaps and limitations, particularly in sustaining this role over any extended period of time, are also well understood. Developing predictable financing and mission support models that enable the AU to enhance the effectiveness of its first responder role and create the right conditions for a successful exit strategy or transition to a UN mission is the top priority. The findings of the recent Joint AU-UN Review provide a useful starting point for taking this forward.

66. *Burden-sharing*: The Common African Position identified AU PSOs as local responses to international problems which represent a significant contribution to the global common good. The financing arrangements for AU PSOs have been ad hoc, lacked predictability, and used instruments and modalities that are not well adapted to supporting PSOs particularly in the context of high-tempo operations. Financing AU PSOs on a sustainable basis is a global strategic imperative, given the complex and interconnected nature of threats to international peace and security.

67. The July 2016 AU Assembly Decision on the Peace Fund is a powerful demonstration of the determination and commitment of the AU and its members to addressing the lack of predictability and sustainability in PSO financing by implementing its decision to finance 25% of AU PSOs. Agreeing on the principle that UN assessed contributions should be used to support AU mandated or authorized missions that are mandated by the UNSC will be an important complementary step.

68. *Predictability and Harmonization*: As outlined in the lessons learned section, the AUC's administrative and financial management systems require strengthening and are not adapted to enabling flexible and timely responses to peace and security requirements. As a result, overall support is not harmonized and is delivered through multiple channels each with their own onerous reporting requirements, diffuse delivery channels and high transaction costs. There is also a sense that the real cost of AU Member States' contributions to PSOs are not adequately captured and are therefore frequently under-valued. At the same time, there is a lack of consensus on the specific costs that can be legitimately reflected as a contribution. As a result of all the multiple instruments, it is virtually impossible to estimate the real cost of AU PSOs.

69. The revitalized Peace Fund will establish an Instrument for financing operational peace and security activities in a flexible and adaptive manner within a strong governance and fiduciary accountability framework. The Peace Fund will provide the platform for the harmonization of all Member State and partner support and the reduction of multiple reporting lines. Work is already underway on the operationalization of the Peace Fund in line with the Kigali Decision.

70. *Mutual Accountability*: Ensuring all AU missions are compliant with international human rights and humanitarian law as well as accepted international norms of conduct and discipline, is an obligation applicable to the AU and all its Member States. Progress has already been made within the AU to ensure that its missions are in compliance with international legal obligations. The AU has begun work to address the remaining policy and institutional gaps in this area.

C. *Adapting Financial, Procurement and Administrative rules and procedures to the requirements of AU PSOs*

71. In 2016, the AU made progress in factoring in the unique requirement of AU PSOs in its new financial rules and regulations. It has also taken steps to strengthen its financial management and accountability framework with the adoption of International Public Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS) in 2013. The new Procurement manual launched in October 2016 also included amendments to allow for speedier procurement processes for PSOs.

72. Despite these important steps there is still significant work required to develop operational rules and procedures to strengthen the effectiveness of AU PSOs.

73. Alongside this, and despite innovations in recent years, the UN's internal administrative framework is not fully adapted to the specific requirements of high-tempo operations associated with the three of the four types of missions that an AU PSO is likely to undertake: Preventive deployment and peace enforcement operations; Stabilization Missions and Regional Security Initiatives against national/transnational threats.

74. With the adoption of the Peace Fund decision, there is now an opportunity to take a comprehensive look at how to adapt overall financial, procurement and administrative procedures to the specific requirements of AU PSOs. These would include:

(i) Putting in place a dedicated rapid recruitment and deployment procedure to respond to the Mission Start up staffing requirements and timelines. The current recruitment process takes an average of six to twelve months,

(ii) Developing SOPs to handle the procurement and define the dedicated framework contract to effectively support the logistics and supply requirements of AU PSOs,

(iii) Developing an Integrated manual including SOPs on AU PSOs facilities management,

(iv) Developing a PSO Accounting manual an AU Reimbursement framework adapted to the specific requirements of AU PSOs.

75. The new Peace Fund rules and procedures will be developed ensuring the comparative advantage of AU PSOs is maintained. In practice, this would mean ensuring that the Peace Fund focuses on financing priority areas and mission costs that ensure the AU retains its rapid deployment capabilities. More broadly there is an opportunity for innovation, avoiding some of the pitfalls of UN rules and procedures which, as numerous reports have identified, are increasingly unsuited to the requirements of UN peacekeeping requirements let alone those of AU PSOs. These adapted rules and procedures will sit within an overall Peace Fund accountability framework that meets the requirements of AU Member States and its partners.

76. One of the outcomes of the two AU – UN Consultative meetings on the implementation of UNSCR 2320 was an agreement that the UN Secretariat would provide technical assistance to support the AUC in the development of the rules and procedures where the AUC has identified the need for additional support and where the UN can add value. Moreover, in cases where financial support will be provided by the UN, ensuring compatibility between UN and AU budgetary and financial procedures is required. Requests for resources from UN assessed

contributions would require budgetary review by, approval of and reporting to the UN General Assembly.

77. The Peace Fund's governance structures will be in place by July 2017. A management structure will be in place by September 2017 and a set of dedicated Peace Fund financial, procurement and administrative rules and procedures will be developed by October 2017.

D. *Strengthening the AU's PSO planning and management capacities*

78. Window 2 of the Peace Fund, is intended to support the development of the critical institutional capacities required to effectively implement Windows 1 and 3 of the Peace Fund. With respect to Window 3 (PSOs), a number of the institutional gaps identified in the lessons learned section of this report will be prioritized for support under the initial Peace Fund allocations.

79. This represents an opportunity to move away from a reliance on ad hoc and interim capacity support to a more structured and enduring form of institutional development of both the AUC's and REC/RM PSO capacities.

E. *Strengthening AU PSO Human Rights/International Humanitarian Law & Conduct & Discipline Compliance*

80. This section (a) outlines the steps that have been taken to enhance human rights and compliance standards in AU peace support operations (PSOs), as well as steps being undertaken in the areas of force preparation, force employment and post-force employment towards enhancing AU compliance regime, and (b) identifies what remains to be done at the policy, institutional and operational levels building on the August 2016 AU High Representative for the Peace Fund's Report. It is hoped that in the next 2-3 years, the AU will have in place robust implementation strategies and response mechanisms for compliance issues at both the strategic and mission levels. A detailed work plan is included as Annex 2.

81. In operationalizing this framework, there are two key points two note: First, is that the AU will have differentiated accountabilities in line with who is delivering the different types of missions identified, i.e. the AU, a REC/RM or coalition of member states and whether it is AU mandated or authorised. Most of the AU's institutional experience is derived from AU mandated and implemented missions. Identifying the specific AU accountabilities in cases where it has authorised a mission that is implemented by a REC/RMs or coalitions of Member States and putting

in place the appropriate compliance measures will be an important part of the implementation plan.

82. Second, the AU has put in place an ambitious timeline for the full operationalization of its HR/IHL/CD framework. Nonetheless, and bearing in mind the experiences from the UN system, it is important to note that the full implementation of the compliance framework can be expected to take several years and will evolve continuously.

Progress in the Enhancement of Human Rights and Conduct and Discipline Compliance in Peace Support Operations

83. Despite many challenges, the African Union has been deploying efforts to address human rights and conduct and discipline compliance in PSOs in line with African and international instruments. The progress made is most discernible in the following areas: the development of policy/guidelines and relevant Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); mainstreaming International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights as part of mission planning and management; ensuring the establishment of protection mechanisms as part of mission structures, and enhancing human resources capacity in human rights and compliance. Some of the highlights include:

a. AU Draft Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians in African Union Peace Support Operations and the Aide-Mémoire on the Protection of Civilians (PoC) drafted in order to provide guidance on developing a consistent and effective strategy to implement protection objectives and ensure that these actions are conforming to relevant international law, including IHL and human rights law.

b. AU Guidelines on detention and DDR have been developed in order to provide direction on how to deal with detainees in compliance with international law and standards. In 2011, AMISOM also developed an Indirect Fire Policy in order to limit the level of unintentional harm to civilians due to the use of indirect fire weapons.

c. Even though AU Member States have the primary responsibility to train their troops prior to deployment in AU PSOs, the standards for effective and appropriate training are detailed in an MoU signed between the AU and P/TCCs. TCCs also receive Guidelines, which inter alia, provide for common training requirements (with special attention on IHL, protection of IDPs, DDR, appropriate reaction to riots, civil disturbances etc.).

d. The AU already has extensive experience in pre-deployment verification visits (PDV) during which it is verified, among other things, whether the troops have been trained on IHL and human rights obligations. Additionally, the partnership between the AU and relevant partners including the UN, EU, US, UK, amongst others, has proved to be effective in ensuring a robust pre-deployment and in-mission training programs in PSOs, and these partnerships can be further explored in order to adequately address IHL/human rights obligations.

e. IHL/Human rights and protection capacities were not always integrated as part of AU mandated or authorized PSOs at mission level. In that regard AMISOM, even though a very particular AU mission, has been the most advanced. For example, AMISOM has established a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis, and Response Cell (CCTARC) as well as the office of Boards of Inquiry (BOI). CCTARC captures and records reported events and incidents of civilian casualties within AMISOM area of operation through a comprehensive electronic database. AMISOM is also set to begin the process of making ex-gratia payments for civilian harms in Somalia. In that regard, an SOP on making of ex-gratia payments to civilian casualties of AMISOM operations is being finalized (final approval remains). BOI office, on the other hand, has been playing an investigative role in the Mission, in response to incidents of possible misconduct or violations during AMISOM operations. Different personnel working on protection issues (Conduct and Discipline officer, IHL adviser, etc.) are part of the AMISOM protection cluster. While all these bodies and mechanisms are instrumental in dealing with IHL/Human rights and conduct and discipline matters, the AU is aware of the challenges in making them fully operational and effective. In that regard, an assessment of the best practices, challenges and gaps within these mechanisms is ongoing. This will ensure that existing and future AU missions will benefit from AMISOM experiences in order to better address IHL/Human rights and conduct and discipline issues.

84. As part of its commitment to enhance compliance with international norms and standards, a Conduct and Discipline Officer and Legal Affairs Officer specialized in human rights issues were recruited to PSOD in February 2017. The strengthening of AUC capacity in these areas will significantly complement existing efforts by the AUC to enhance human rights and IHL in peace support operations. The enhancement of capacities at both AUC and at the mission level will facilitate better policy

dissemination and regular monitoring and reporting on conduct and discipline, IHL/human rights and related matters. While recognizing the differences between conduct and discipline and IHL/human rights issues as well as the differentiated responses to these two areas in case of violations, the AU has opted for an integrated approach on these matters. These are understood as protection-wide issues that should be addressed through the same framework but with distinct policies and procedures and systems to address each.

Addressing Existing Gaps in AU Human Rights and Conduct and Discipline Compliance Framework

85. Some AU PSOs differ in terms of mandate, command and control and there is no "one size fits all" approach to protection and compliances issues. This means the AU will have to deploy discrete efforts to address some of the specific challenges and gaps of IHL/human rights and conduct and discipline compliance in the areas of force preparation, force employment and post-force employment. These phases are in accordance with the recently developed draft Five Year Maputo Workplan on the Enhancement of the African Standby Force (2016-2020).

86. The recent reinforcement of AU capacities in terms of expertise on conduct and discipline, human rights and IHL has been helpful in enabling the AU to implement some of the activities outlined in the work plan in order to further enhance AU PSOs' compliance with international law and standards. Additional resources will, however, be required to fully implement the workplan. During this process, the AU will also, where appropriate and based on their areas of expertise, consult its strategic partners in the finalization of the relevant policies and other documents.

87. In terms of timelines, 2017 will be dedicated to developing additional policies and other key guiding documents that are critical for establishing the compliance framework. This will include identifying key positions at the strategic level to monitor and respond to violations and abuses.

88. The AU is dedicated to further strengthening its pre-deployment verification, selection and screening, and training of the troops. It has been observed that often pre-deployment training (PDT) on IHL issues depends on the provision of training by partners (e.g. ICRC) and AU intends to be more exigent in terms of PDT requirements from P/TCCs by including these requirements in the MoU. It is important to keep in mind that because of the offensive nature of conflicts in which the AU PSOs are involved, in-mission training is often quite difficult to organize. In that regard, adequate PDT becomes even more important. A number of

harmonized training standards, including on PoC, are being developed by the AU for future use in PDT and in-mission trainings.

89. The AUC will develop a Policy/SOP on selection and screening in the coming months and the work is underway to develop models for Certification of Contingents and Troop/Police Contributing Countries and Human Rights screening of Senior Mission Leadership Teams. The inclusion of a Conduct and Discipline officer and/or a Human Rights officer in PDVs is also envisaged.

90. With respect to strategic documents on compliance issues, the AU has prioritized the development and adoption of the following key policy documents, all of which already exist in a draft form:

(i) Conduct and Discipline Policy;
(ii) Policy on Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Support Operations; and
(iii) Policy for Whistleblowers in Peace Support Operations.

91. The AUC is working towards ensuring that the policies are adopted by the end of September 2017. Following their adoption, the focus will be on the dissemination of the rules captured in the polies and putting in place of appropriate mechanisms to investigate and address any misconduct.

92. When missions have been deployed to the area of operations, the AU will institutionalize the following:

(i) Mainstreaming of human rights and compliance standards in all Mission documents (RoE, FC, SRCC and PC Directives) when they are being drafted;
(ii) In Mission Contingent welfare and support;
(iii) In-Mission training needs assessment and provision of adequate training accordingly;
(iv) Existence of effective compliance mechanisms in all PSOs (CCTARC, PoC, BOI);
(v) Investigation and response of incidents of civilian harm. In that regard, the AU is currently developing a Third Party Claims Policy;
(vi) Periodic reporting on compliance standards through reports of the Chairperson to the AU PSC.

93. According to the MoU that the AUC has concluded with P/TCCs, the P/TCC government retains exclusive criminal jurisdiction in relation to offenses committed by its members. However, the government is supposed to keep AUC informed about the progress and outcomes of the

case and the AU should be able to follow up on disciplinary measures taken by P/TCCs on specific cases. These requirements will be reinforced in the revised MoUs between P/TCCs and AUC. Good practices, such as the establishment of in-court martials by TCCs in AMISOM, have proved to be an important model for promoting greater compliance, accountability and transparency in the promotion of human rights and IHL in PSOs. The AU will also need to reflect on possible ways of creating an independent monitoring and investigation capacity that would be able to do independent investigations alongside P/TCCs.

94. Finally, the welfare of uniformed and civilian peacekeepers including psycho-social support, when required, should be prioritized as a preventive and mitigation measure against misconduct and abuse in AU peace support operations.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS AND WAY FORWARD

95. In order to strengthen its ability to respond to the emergence of increasingly complex peace and security threats and challenges, the AU Assembly took some important financing decisions in 2015 and 2016. The implementation of these AU decisions on Financing and the Peace Fund will significantly strengthen the international peace and security architecture.

96. To drive forward the implementation of these decisions, the following key actions should be prioritized:

On Financing

a) Accelerate the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund in line with the AU Assembly's July 2016 Kigali Decision: Securing Member State financing in line with the Year 1 Peace Fund target, while delivering the transitional requirements at national and AUC level for the full financing of the Peace Fund ($400m by 2020) in line with the targets, benchmarks and timelines set out in this report will be a top priority in 2017.

b) A UNSC resolution in 2017 establishing the principle that UN Assessed contributions should, on a case by case basis, finance, AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UN Security Council. This will address the chronic problem of the lack of predictable and sustainable financing for AU mandated or authorised PSOs.

On Consultative Decision-making

c) Adopt the Joint planning and Consultative Decision-making Framework: A draft proposal on AU-UN joint planning and consultative decision-making for AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UN Security Council and financed through UN Assessed Contributions is included in this report. It is recommended that the PSC endorses this framework as a basis for ensuring predictable and co-ordinated decision-making and oversight within the context of the AU-UN partnership.

On Institutional Strengthening

d) Finance critical institutional development priorities. We recommend that Window 2 of the Peace Fund prioritises the following institutional capacities for financing in 2017 and 2018:

i. Mission planning and management capacity: The Joint AU/UN Review and the lessons learned section of this report have highlighted the key AU PSO capacities that need to be enhanced. It is recommended that a priority action plan to strengthen these core planning and management capacities be developed and costed.

ii. Developing Peace Fund Financial and Administrative Rules and procedures that ensure the timely and effective prevention and management of, and responses to, conflict and insecurity: The report has outlined the various policies, rules and procedures, covering issues such as financial management and accounting, human resources, procurement, and an AU Reimbursment Framework, that will need to be developed. Additional human resources will be required to undertake much of this work. Some aspects of this work will require close co-operation with the United Nations. For these elements, a joint action plan with clearly identified benchmarks and timelines will be put in place.

iii. Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, Conduct & Discipline Compliance: The workplan contained in Annex 2 of this report sets out the key targets, milestones and timelines to address the outstanding institutional and policy gaps in this area. Implementing the various actions in the work plan in a timely manner will require additional resources and the establishment of clear partnership agreements with UN and other relevant organisations based on the AU's requirements.

Annex 1: List of Peace Support Operations in Africa (2003 to Date)

Mission	Country	Years active
African Union-mandated missions		
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)	Burundi	2003-2004
African Union Mission in Sudan I and II (AMIS)	Sudan	2004-2007
African Union Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC)	Comoros	2004
African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)	Comoros	2006
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	Somalia	2007-present
African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in the Comoros (MAES)	Comoros	2007-2008
African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	Sudan	2008-present
African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)	Mali	2012-2013
African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA)	CAR	2013-2014
African Union-authorized Missions		
Operation Democracy in the Comoros	Comoros	2008
Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)	CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Uganda	2011-present
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)	Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin	2015-present
Deployments by Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms		
ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau	Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Togo, Senegal, Niger	2012
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)	Nigeria, Mali, Senegal	2003
ECOWAS Forces in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)	Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo	2003
Multinational Force for Central African Republic (FOMAC)	Republic of Congo, Chad, Cameroon and Gabon	2007
Mission of the Conseil de Paix et Sécurité de la CEEAC (MICOPAX)	Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon,	2008 to 2013
ECOWAS Intervention Mission in The Gambia	Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and Togo	2017 to Date

Table 1: Legal Basis for AU PSOs

Source	Provision	Notes
UN Charter	**Chapter 8, Articles 53 and 54** The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies **for enforcement action** under its authority. But **no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council (Article 53)**. And the UN Security Council **shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation** under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 54). Chapter 7, provides enforcement parameters.	Requires UNSC authorisation UNSC must be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation.
African Union Constitutive Act	**Article 4 (h),** the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State *pursuant to a decision of the Assembly* in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; **Article 4 (j),** the right of *Member States to request intervention from the Union*	**Article 7 (1),** the Assembly shall take its decisions by consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States of the Union.
AU Peace and Security Council Protocol	**Article 7 (c),** the PSC authorizes the mounting and deployment of peace support missions. **Article 7 (f),** approve the modalities for intervention by the Union in a Member State, following a decision by the Assembly, pursuant to article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act. **Article 7 (k),** promote and develop a strong "partnership for peace and security" between the Union and the United Nations and its agencies. **Article 17 (2),** where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Unions' activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.	**Article 8 (13)** Decisions of the Peace and Security Council shall generally be guided by the principle of consensus. In cases where consensus cannot be reached, the Peace and Security Council shall adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters shall be made by a two-thirds majority vote of its Members voting.

Annex 2: AU Human Rights and Conduct and Discipline Framework (2017) from Legal Obligations to Implementing Mechanisms

Serial	Objective	Tasks	Outputs	Deadline
This work plan looks at steps that need to be taken to ensure effective implementation of IHL/Human Rights and Conduct and Discipline obligations, in terms of policy development, mainstreaming of IHL/Human Rights in the planning processes of PSOs, as well as strengthening training, monitoring and accountability capacities at the level of the AUC and AU mission levels.				
Workshops on compliance issues				
Overall objective: Learning from experiences of AU and UN PSOs on compliance issues				
1.	Assessment of AU mandated or authorised PSOs HR/IHL compliance practice and approaches	Recruit consultant to undertake assessment and develop evidence based and field informed recommendations for mission and HQ level institutional capacity development	Report would feed into approach on enhancing AU compliance with IHL/Human Rights in future PSOs	May/Jue 2017 (TBD)
2.	Exchange of experiences from AU and UN PSOs on the continent on practical measures to be taken in PSOs in order to ensure respect for IHL	Event organized by the ICRC on the Operationalization of the obligation to ensure respect of IHL in multinational operations	Practical recommendations that will guide AU and UN PSOs in better ensuring respect for IHL	30-31 May 2017
Policies				
Overall objective: Provide strategic guidance for AU PSOs regarding issues of IHL and human rights compliance as well as matters of conduct and discipline				
3.	Finalise the **Conduct and Discipline Policy**, including **Policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse** and **Whistle-blower Policy**	• Meeting of Interdepartmental Task Force • Consultation with Partners/Stakeholders • Consultative Workshop on the Finalization of the 3 policies • Approval of the Policies by the Chairperson	Finalised and adopted Policies on conduct and discipline-related matters	September 2017
4.	The revised ASF/PSO doctrine addresses compliance issues in an appropriate matter	• Inclusion of IHL/human rights compliance in the ASF/PSO revised doctrine	ASF/PSO revised doctrine	December 2017
5.	Develop a framework within which decisions on compensation to	Develop Third Party Claims Policy	Third Party Claims Policy adopted	October 2017

	civilians and other third parties, including ex-gratia payments, can be made			
6.	AU takes adequate steps to deploy only PSO personnel that meets international law compliance standards	Develop SOP on screening and selection	SOP on screening and selection adopted	December 2017
7.	AU is able to undertake risk assessment, and elaborate conditions and mitigating measures of providing support to AU authorised PSOs (MNJTF, RCI-LRA)	Develop Policy and guidelines on Due Diligence	AU Policy ont Due Diligence	December 2017
8.	Develop a Legal Framework Aide-Memoire for AU PSOs	Capture legal obligations of AU PSOs, as well as steps that need to be taken in order to ensure compliance with these obligations in a consolidated Legal Framework Aide-Memoire	Legal Framework Aide-Memoire for AU PSOs	November 2017
Selection and Screening				
Overall objective: Strengthening pre-deployment verification, including selection and screening in order to ensure that contingents and individuals deployed in AU PSOs satisfy compliance criteria				
9.	MOUs between AUC and P/TCCs, as well as with RECs/RM include compliance requirements	• Revise MOUs that AU has concluded with P/TCCs in AU-led PSOs • Draft a model MOU for future PSOs • Add an addendum to existing MOUs if needed	Draft model MOU	September 2017
10.	Verify effective provision of IHL/Human Rights training before deployment	• PDVs to include verification whether appropriate training on IHL/human rights has been provided; • Ensure systematic participation of the Conduct and Discipline officer and/or Human Rights officer in PDVs	PDV reports include a paragraph on the fulfilment of compliance requirements	To be discussed within PSOD
11.	Certification of Contingents and Troop/Police Contributing Countries	• Develop a model note in which the P/TCC Government certifies that it has conducted screening for violations and misconduct	CV form for contingent members	June 2017

		for the contingent being deployed in an AU PSO		
12.	Human Rights screening of all Senior Mission Leadership Team (from P5 and above).	• Develop a model note for certification of individuals in order to ensure that they have not committed, been convicted of, nor prosecuted for, any criminal offence, and/or been involved, by act or omission, in the commission of any violation of IHRL/IHL	Member State Note of Certification	June 2017
Training				
Overall objective: to ensure harmonized and contextualized PDT on IHL and Human Rights, including other cross-cutting issues, as well as training needs assessments and in-mission trainings after the deployment				
13.	Completion of the Comprehensive AU PSO pre-deployment and Specialisation/in-mission and management training standards for ali three components that adequately covers on IHL/ Human Rights and related protection frameworks	• Finalize and publish the AU PoC Training Standards • Revise the Standards Foundation, underlying PDT requirements on IHL/Human Rights and other protection related issues • Revise ASF/AU PSO Training Policy in order to take into account compliance related issues • Ensure that AU Training Standards are complementing and cross-referring to each other • Ensure development and implementation of mission-specific training policies that take into account specificities of the mandate and mission requirements	• AU PoC Training Standards • Revised Harmonized Standards for pre-deployment and Specialisation/in-mission training • ASF/AU PSO Strategic Training Policy revised, disseminated and utilised • Mission specific Training Policies in place and utilised	Ongoing
14.	Continue ensuring that P/TCCs and AU PSOs personnel are trained on IHL/Human Rights and conduct and discipline issues	• AU continues to work with APSTA to ensure and guarantee coordinated and harmonised training support to ASF/AU PSO personnel at the strategic, operational and tactical levels • AU provides additional support to National and Regional Training Centres – for instance through the	• Training support by National and Regional Training Centres guaranteed • Harmonized ToT facilitated	Ongoing

		conduct of Conduct training of trainers (ToT), in accordance with Annual ASF Training Directives		
15.	In-mission training on IHL/human rights takes into account the specificities of the mission's mandate and challenges	• Training Needs Assessments for specific missions done regularly • Training of Senior Mission Leadership, military component commanders and managers is provided in line with ASF/AU Training Standards	Assessments, trainings and workshops	Ongoing
Monitoring, tracking and reporting				
Overall objective: appropriate mechanisms are put in place at both strategic and mission levels in order to address allegations and abuses in PSOs				
16.	Establishment of an AU "compliance capacity" with tasks of monitoring and reporting on IHL/Human Rights and conduct and discipline issues	• Positions needed for the "compliance capacity" and modalities of its work are discussed at the PSD level • "Compliance capacity" or "Compliance task force" (TBD) consists of Conduct and Discipline officer, Human Rights officer, Legal Affairs Officer and any other expert on protection issues • Field reports, including incident reports are sent to the "compliance capacity" where they are analysed and action is proposed • "compliance capacity" reports on compliance are provided regularly to the Chairperson by AU PSO personnel • A confidential database of all cases of misconduct and IHL/human rights violations is created => this can be used in the future for screening purposes	All AU personnel working on compliance issues are coordinating their activities in order to monitor and report on compliance by AU PSOs	TBD
17.	Inclusion of human rights, IHL and conduct and discipline compliance in reports of the AUC Chairperson		AUC Chairperson reports to UNSC and AUPSC	Ongoing

18.	Appropriate mechanisms in place at the mission level – e.g. Protection cluster, CCTARC, BOI etc.			Depends on the mission
Accountability				
Overall objective: ensure effective response and accountability mechanisms at strategic and mission levels				
19.	Reinforced MOU with compliance requirements and consequences of non-compliance	• Revise the existing MOUs • Draft a model MOU	Model MOU	August 2017
20.	Consultations with P/TCCs on the feasibility of deploying court martials in the mission area	Organize a working level meeting with P/TCCs and RECs/RMs	An internal report that reflects P/TCCs opinions on the matter	February 2018
21.	AU established independent monitoring and investigation capacity			2018
22.	Communication strategy on responding to allegations of violations	Drafting of a communication strategy on ways to respond in case of allegations of violations of IHL/human rights and misconduct	Communication strategy	December 2017

United Nations S/2017/497

Security Council

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Letter dated 13 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 10-13 June 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) P. **Iliichev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

17-10249 (E) 210617 220617

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Annex to the letter dated 13 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (10 June 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: four in Damascus and two in Dar'a.

The Turkish representative office has reported five violations in the following governorates: three in Dar'a, one in Idlib and one in Ladhiqiyah.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations.

In total, 1,327 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The United Nations and partners are continuing to provide food, medical, psychological and legal assistance to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic. Work is also continuing to restore infrastructure and provide temporary housing to all those in need.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,571.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 219.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (11 June 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported four incidents of gunfire: two in Hama governorate, one in Ladhiqiyah governorate and one in Damascus city.

The Turkish representative office has reported three violations: one in Ladhiqiyah governorate and two in Dar'a city.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out six humanitarian operations, including:

Five in Aleppo city, delivering 1.3 tons of food parcels to the local population;

One in Bayt Rayhan in Ladhiqiyah governorate, delivering 1 ton of food parcels to the local population.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 2.3 tons.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 700 people.

In total, 1,333 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During the humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics provided medical assistance to 273 people.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,571.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 219.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (12 June 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported three incidents of gunfire in Damascus governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported two violations in Dar'a governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations in Aleppo city, delivering 3.6 tons of water to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,130 people.

In total, 1,336 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During the humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics provided medical assistance to 361 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,571.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 219.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (13 June 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: four in Damascus and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations: one in Dar'a governorate and three in Damascus governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations in Aleppo city, delivering 3.6 tons of drinking water to the local population.

Humanitarian aid was provided to 1,130 people.

In total, 1,339 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During the humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian field medics provided medical assistance.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, one ceasefire agreement has been signed in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,572.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 219.

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Security Council

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14 June 2017

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Letter dated 13 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to submit to you a letter dated 6 June 2017 from the Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, regarding a video that went viral on both social and electronic media showing a young Kashmiri, Farooq Ahmed Dar, tied to the bonnet of a military jeep as a human shield (see annex). The video gives a glimpse of the most egregious human rights violations by Indian occupation forces in Jammu and Kashmir.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council in connection with the item entitled "The India-Pakistan question".

(*Signed*) Maleeha **Lodhi**

17-09739 (E) 150617

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Annex to the letter dated 13 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Letter dated 6 June 2017 from the Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am sure that you must have seen the video of the young Kashmiri, Farooq Ahmed Dar, tied to the bonnet of a military jeep leading a convoy through central Kashmir's Budgam district that went viral on both social and electronic media. The victim, a resident of the village of Chilbrass in Budgam, while speaking to the media, stated that soldiers from the Indian army's 53 Rashtriya Rifles unit had grabbed him in the village of Utligam, beat him up and dipped him several times in the cold water of a stream before tying his unconscious body to the bonnet of an army jeep.

An inquiry was launched into Major Leetul Gogoi, the officer who conducted the operation, presumably to relieve pressure on the Indian armed forces. However, even before the inquiry had been completed, he was awarded a commendation medal by the Indian Army Chief as an endorsement of his actions. The top officials of the Indian Government have reportedly defended and expressed appreciation for Major Gogoi. The Attorney General of India allegedly said that he saluted him for his presence of mind. The National Secretary-General of the Bharatiya Janata Party, Ram Madhav, on 20 April complimented Major Gogoi, saying "everything is fair in love and war".

While human rights activists and organizations all over the world, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have condemned this inhumane practice of using human shields, we have seen disturbing statements by the Indian Army Chief justifying this heinous act. In his interview with the Press Trust of India, he stated that the Indian army was facing a "dirty war" in Jammu and Kashmir that had to be fought with "innovative" ways. In an apparent endorsement of the use of human shields, he further said: "I have to maintain the morale of my troops who are operating there. In fact, I wish these people, instead of throwing stones at us, were firing weapons at us. Then I would have been happy. Then I could do what I (want to do)." He is also reported to have said that the main objective of giving an award to Major Gogoi when a court of inquiry was finalizing its probe into the incident was the following: "to boost the morale of young officers of the force who are operating in a very difficult environment. This is a proxy war and proxy war is a dirty war. It is played in a dirty way. The rules of engagement are there when the adversary comes face-to-face and fights with you. It is a dirty war. That is where innovation comes in. You fight a dirty war with innovations."

Similar laudatory sentiments were expressed by the Chief Minister of Indian Punjab, Amarinder Singh, in an article published in the *Indian Express* on 20 May 2017, where he justified this inhumane act, stating that the "Major Gogoi episode is clearly and unequivocally in favour of the officer, who only did what was absolutely correct, and possibly the only sane and logical course of action available to him, in the circumstances". Justifying the use of an innocent Kashmiri as a human shield in stark contravention of basic human rights and international conventions, including but not limited to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reflects the deep approval that this barbaric act of State terrorism by India has in the latest among the chain of continuing human rights violations in Indian-occupied Kashmir by Indian occupation forces. Allowing selective moral intuition to justify

bludgeoning innocent Kashmiris with pellet guns, blinding hundreds, including children and young girls, or now using them as human shields is deplorable and has no place in the civilized world of today.

The practice of using human shields under any pretext is illegal under the national law of all civilized nations and under international law. Mr. Dar was driven around to make a larger point directed at those Kashmiri civilians who dare to differ with the Indian-occupied state. The brutal dehumanizing violence against Kashmiris in Indian-occupied Kashmir has unfortunately become a matter of routine.

Indian actions have no place in the civilized world of today. The world has to a duty to speak up and speak out against the gross human rights violations of the innocent Kashmiris by Indian occupation forces.

I call upon you to look into the matter and urge India to put an immediate stop to the bloodshed in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

(*Signed*) Sartaj **Aziz**

United Nations S/2017/499

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 June 2017

Original: English

Identical letters dated 13 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 31 May 2017 from the Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, addressed to the President of the Security Council, drawing attention to the grave human rights situation in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian intensification of barbarities since the extrajudicial killing of Kashmiri leader Burhan Wani on 8 July 2016 and, more recently, his successor, Sabzar Ahmad Bhat, on 27 May 2017 (see annex).

It is requested that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council, in connection with the item entitled "The India-Pakistan question".

(*Signed*) Maleeha **Lodhi**

17-10245 (E) 220617

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Annex to the identical letters dated 13 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Letter dated 31 May 2017 from the Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Foreign Affairs addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to bring to your kind attention the grave and dire human rights situation in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian barbarities have intensified after the extrajudicial killing of Kashmiri leader Burhan Wani on 8 July 2016. The Indian occupying forces continued to use live ammunition and pellet guns against the protesters, as a result of which more than 200 civilians were killed and around 20,000 were injured. The Indian occupation forces carried out a mass-blinding of the Kashmiri youth, including women and children, by deliberately targeting their eyes with pellet gun shots. This is the first incident of mass-blinding in human history. A curfew remained imposed in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir continuously for more than four months. Around 12,000 people were arrested.

The situation has further deteriorated fast since the Srinagar by-elections held on 9 April 2017. The people of Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir boycotted the sham elections to demonstrate their rejection of Indian occupation. As a result of gunfire, 10 innocent Kashmiris, including a 12-year-old boy, were killed and over 200 were injured. On 15 April, the Indian forces attacked a college in Pulwama, killing one youth and injuring more than 50 students. Since that attack, regular protests, particularly by the students, including female students, have been going on in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

In another attempt by Indian occupation forces to quell the freedom movement, a youth leader, Sabzar Ahmad Bhat, the successor to Burhan Wani, was killed on 27 May 2017 in Tral, in southern Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. In another incident, six people were killed in the district of Baramulla by the Indian army, which had dubbed them "infiltrators". The recent wave of State terrorism has killed 12 innocent Kashmiris.

After those incidents, spontaneous shutdowns and protests were observed in all districts and major towns of the Valley. Public transport went off the roads throughout the Valley. Schools and colleges were closed. The Indian occupation forces are continuing to use live ammunition and pellet gun shots against defenceless protesters. As a result, one civilian has died and about 50 have been injured, with many of them in critical condition. A curfew has been imposed throughout Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Police arrested the Chair of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, Muhammad Yasin Malik, and held him on remand at Srinagar central jail for five days.

During this latest spate of oppression, many videos have surfaced showing Indian barbarities. One such video shows a man tied to an army vehicle as a human shield against stone-pelters. Instead of taking punitive action against the officer involved in this heinous crime (Major Gogoi), the Indian army chief awarded him a commendation card. This action by the Indian Government validates that it is encouraging and supporting its occupation forces to commit the worst form of State terrorism in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

The current situation in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir is the result of the continued denial by India of the right to self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, which was promised to them by the Security Council in numerous resolutions that have remained unimplemented to date.

As the President of the Security Council, you have a special responsibility with regard to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Despite the passage of seven decades, the people of Jammu and Kashmir still await the implementation of the Security Council resolutions that promised them the right to self-determination, to be exercised through the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.

I would like to urge you to call upon the Indian Government to immediately stop the bloodshed in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir and respect the fundamental rights of the Kashmiri people.

(*Signed*) Sartaj **Aziz**

United Nations S/2017/500

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 June 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 9 June 2017 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

The identical letters from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General dated 7 June 2017 (S/2017/481) have been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

The Security Council respectfully requests the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on how the Security Council could best meet the request of the Colombian parties for a second special political mission in Colombia.

In the light of the urgency of the request from the Colombian parties, the Security Council would welcome initial recommendations by 23 June, in consultation with the parties as necessary.

(*Signed*) Sacha Sergio **Llorentty Soliz**
President of the Security Council

17-09787 (E) 140617

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United Nations A/71/931–S/2017/501

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
15 June 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 41
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 13 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 13 June 2017, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative

17-09889 (E) 200617

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 13 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 30 May 2017 (A/71/917-S/2017/461) addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, which yet again contains false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion regarding "illegally issued" notices to airmen, it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out by the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claim in the letter regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, this claim ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. Furthermore, I would like to stress that the allegation regarding the interference of radio frequencies is also totally baseless.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all air and sea ports in Northern Cyprus "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly stated, "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)."

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2016 alone, the number of passengers who used Ercan Airport stood at 3,628,887, while this number is expected to be around 3,900,000 in 2017. Moreover, in 2016, 27,109 aircraft used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure and 210,789 aircraft used the Ercan advisory airspace, and these numbers are expected to be around 28,080 and 225,000, respectively, in 2017. In that regard, it must also be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944, and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

At a time when the comprehensive settlement negotiations are at a critical stage, I deem it necessary to stress the need to fully channel all our efforts towards achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters and the Joint Declaration of 11 February 2014, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric, which is not reflective of the joint vision and cooperation expressed by the leaders of both communities on the island since the resumption of the settlement talks in May 2015. As the two future partners on the island of Cyprus, we should never lose sight of the fact that the solution of the Cyprus problem will comprehensively deal with all pending issues between the two sides and thus focus all our efforts towards the ultimate goal of settlement.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that, as the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance for a results-oriented negotiating process within the context of your good offices mission in Cyprus and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2017/502

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 June 2017

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 7488th meeting, held on 20 July 2015 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to report at any time any issue of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments.

Accordingly, the President herewith circulates the report of the Director General dated 2 June 2017 (see annex).

17-10326 (E) 230617

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Annex

Letter dated 2 June 2017 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclosure herewith the document submitted to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the enclosed document to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yukiya **Amano**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council), is on the Islamic Republic of Iran's (Iran's) implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and on matters related to verification and monitoring in Iran in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). It also provides information on financial matters, and the Agency's consultations and exchanges of information with the Joint Commission, established by the JCPOA.

B. Background

2. On 14 July 2015, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (E3/EU+3) and Iran agreed on the JCPOA. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), in which, inter alia, it requested the Director General to "undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA".[1] In August 2015, the Board of Governors authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, and report accordingly, for the full duration of those commitments in light of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices. The Board of Governors also authorized the Agency to consult and exchange information with the Joint Commission, as set out in GOV/2015/53 and Corr.1.

3. In December 2016 and January 2017, the Director General shared with Member States nine documents,[2] developed and endorsed by all participants of the Joint Commission, providing clarifications for the implementation of Iran's nuclear-related measures as set out in the JCPOA for its duration.[3]

4. The estimated cost to the Agency for the implementation of Iran's Additional Protocol and for verifying and monitoring Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA is €9.2 million per annum. For 2017, extrabudgetary funding is necessary for €6.2 million of the €9.2 million.[4] As of 24 May 2017, €7.3 million of extrabudgetary funding was available to meet the cost of JCPOA-related activities for 2017 and beyond.

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[1] The actions requested of the Director General by the Security Council as contained in resolution 2231 (2015) are set out in GOV/2015/53 and Corr.1, para. 8.

[2] Reproduced in INFCIRC/907 and INFCIRC/907/Add.1.

[3] GOV/2017/10, para. 3.

[4] The cost of the provisional application of Iran's Additional Protocol (€3.0 million) is being met from the regular budget (GC(60)/2).

C. JCPOA Verification and Monitoring Activities

5. Since 16 January 2016 (JCPOA Implementation Day), the Agency has verified and monitored Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments in accordance with the modalities set out in the JCPOA,[5] consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices, and in an impartial and objective manner.[6,7] The Agency reports the following for the period since the issuance of the Director General's previous quarterly report.[8]

C.1. Activities Related to Heavy Water and Reprocessing

6. Iran has not pursued the construction of the Arak heavy water research reactor (IR-40 Reactor) based on its original design.[9,10] Iran has not produced or tested natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel assemblies specifically designed for the support of the IR-40 Reactor as originally designed, and all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies have remained in storage under continuous Agency monitoring (paras. 3 and 10).[11]

7. Iran has continued to inform the Agency about the inventory of heavy water in Iran and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)[12] and allowed the Agency to monitor the quantities of Iran's heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced at the HWPP (para. 15). In a letter dated 23 April 2017, Iran informed the Agency that the operator of the HWPP intended to shut down the plant for planned maintenance on 27 April 2017. On 16 May 2017, the Agency verified that the plant was shut down and that Iran's stock of heavy water was 128.2 metric tonnes. Throughout the reporting period, Iran had no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water (para. 14).

8. Iran has not carried out activities related to reprocessing at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other facilities it has declared to the Agency (paras. 18 and 21).[13]

C.2. Activities Related to Enrichment and Fuel

9. At the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, there have been no more than 5060 IR-1 centrifuges installed in 30 cascades, which remain in the configurations in the operating units at the time the JCPOA was agreed (para. 27). Iran has

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[5] Including the clarifications referred to in para. 3 of this report.

[6] GOV/2016/8, para. 6.

[7] Note by the Secretariat, 2016/Note 5.

[8] GOV/2017/10.

[9] The calandria was removed from the reactor and rendered inoperable during preparation for Implementation Day and has been retained in Iran (GOV/INF/2016/1, Arak heavy water research reactor, paras. 3(ii) and 3(iii)).

[10] In a letter dated 18 April 2017, Iran informed the Agency that it was changing the name of the facility to Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor.

[11] The paragraph references in parentheses throughout Sections C and D of this report correspond to the paragraphs of "Annex I — Nuclear-related measures" of the JCPOA.

[12] HWPP is a facility for the production of heavy water which, according to the design information provided by Iran to the Agency on 25 January 2016, has a nominal capacity of 16 tonnes of nuclear-grade heavy water per year and an actual capacity of "about 20 tonnes" of nuclear-grade heavy water per year. In a letter dated 12 May 2017, the Agency requested that Iran provide the Agency with the maximum capacity of the plant.

[13] Including hot cells at TRR and the MIX facility and shielded cells, referred to in the decision of the Joint Commission of 14 January 2016 (INFCIRC/907).

withdrawn 48 IR-1 centrifuges from those held in storage[14] for the replacement of damaged or failed IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (para. 29.1).

10. Iran has continued the enrichment of UF_6 at FEP.[15] Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67 per cent U-235 (para. 28).

11. In the period to 27 May 2017, the Agency verified and monitored that Iran fed depleted uranium through the process lines at the Enriched UO_2 Powder Plant (EUPP) until the output material was at the level of natural uranium or less.[16] During the same period, the Agency verified that Iran downblended any enriched uranium in the resulting output material to the level of natural uranium or less.

12. On 27 May 2017, the Agency verified that Iran had downblended to the level of natural uranium the 35.7 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2 enriched up to 3.67 per cent U-235 that it had recovered from the process lines at EUPP in April 2016.[17]

13. Throughout the reporting period, Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 3.67 per cent U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). The quantity of 300 kg of UF_6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.[18]

14. As of 27 May 2017, the quantity of Iran's uranium enriched up to 3.67 per cent U-235 was 79.8 kg,[19] based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.[20]

15. At the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), 1044 IR-1 centrifuges have been maintained in one wing (Unit 2) of the facility (para. 46), of which 1042 IR-1 centrifuges have remained installed in six cascades and two IR-1 centrifuges have remained installed separately for the purpose of conducting "initial research and R&D activities related to stable isotope production".[21] Throughout the reporting period, Iran has not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) activities, and there has not been any nuclear material at the plant (para. 45).

16. All centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage have remained under continuous Agency monitoring (paras. 29, 47, 48 and 70).[22] The Agency has continued to have regular access to relevant buildings at Natanz, including all of FEP and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), and performed daily access upon Agency request (para. 71). The Agency has also continued to have regular access to FFEP, including daily access upon Agency request (para. 51).

17. Iran has conducted its enrichment activities in line with its long term enrichment and R&D enrichment plan, as provided to the Agency on 16 January 2016 (para. 52).

18. On 30 May 2017, the Agency verified that all irradiated TRR fuel elements in Iran have a measured dose rate of no less than 1 rem/hour (at one metre in air).

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[14] Para. 16 of this report.

[15] Under the JCPOA, "[f]or 15 years the Natanz enrichment site will be the sole location for all of Iran's uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D" (para. 72).

[16] As previously reported, on 31 January 2017, Iran started feeding depleted uranium through the process lines at EUPP, under Agency verification and monitoring (GOV/2017/10, para. 11).

[17] COV/2016/23, para. 11.

[18] Considering the standard atomic weight of uranium and fluorine.

[19] Comprising 66.7 kg of uranium in the form of UF_6; 0.9 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2; 9.7 kg of uranium in fuel assemblies and rods; 1.2 kg of uranium as hold up in process lines; and 1.3 kg of uranium in liquid and solid scrap.

[20] Decisions of the Joint Commission of 6 January and 18 December 2016 (INFCIRC/907), and 10 January 2017 (INFCIRC/907/Add.1).

[21] GOV/2016/46, para. 12.

[22] GOV/2016/46, footnote 15.

19. Iran has not operated any of its declared facilities for the purpose of reconverting fuel plates or scrap into UF_6, nor has it informed the Agency that it has built any new facilities for such a purpose (para. 58).

C.3. Centrifuge Research & Development, Manufacturing and Inventory

20. No enriched uranium has been accumulated through enrichment R&D activities, and Iran's enrichment R&D with and without uranium has been conducted using centrifuges within the limits defined in the JCPOA (paras. 32-42).

21. Iran has provided declarations to the Agency of its production and inventory of centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and permitted the Agency to verify the items in the inventory (para. 80.1). The Agency has conducted continuous monitoring, including through the use of containment and surveillance measures, and verified that the declared equipment has been used for the production of rotor tubes and bellows to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in the JCPOA (para. 80.2). Iran has not produced any IR-1 centrifuges to replace those that have been damaged or failed (para. 62).

22. All declared rotor tubes, bellows and rotor assemblies have been under continuous monitoring by the Agency, including those rotor tubes and bellows manufactured since Implementation Day (para. 70). Iran has manufactured rotor tubes using carbon fibre that has been sampled and tested by the Agency, all of which has been subject to Agency containment and surveillance measures.[23,24]

D. Transparency Measures

23. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to use online enrichment monitors and electronic seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to Agency inspectors, and to facilitate the automated collection of Agency measurement recordings registered by installed measurement devices (para. 67.1). Iran has issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for Iran as requested by the Agency, provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in Iran (para. 67.2).

24. Iran has continued to permit the Agency to monitor — through measures agreed with Iran, including containment and surveillance measures — that all uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced in Iran or obtained from any other source is transferred to the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan (para. 68). Iran also provided the Agency with all information necessary to enable the Agency to verify the production of UOC and the inventory of UOC produced in Iran or obtained from any other source (para. 69).

E. Other Relevant Information

25. Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force. The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran's declarations under the Additional Protocol and to conduct complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to sites and other locations in Iran.

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[23] Decision of the Joint Commission of 14 January 2016 (INFCIRC/907).

[24] GOV/2016/46, para. 18.

26. The Agency's verification and monitoring of Iran's other JCPOA nuclear-related commitments continues, including those set out in Sections D, E, S and T of Annex I of the JCPOA.

27. During this reporting period, the Agency has attended one meeting of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission (JCPOA, Annex IV — Joint Commission, para. 6.4.6).

F. Summary

28. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for Iran remained ongoing.

29. Since Implementation Day, the Agency has been verifying and monitoring the implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.

30. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

United Nations S/2017/503

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 June 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2296 (2016), by which the Council extended the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 30 June 2017 and requested me to report every 90 days on its implementation. The report provides an update and analysis of the conflict, the political situation and the operational environment in Darfur, including the main challenges to the effective implementation of the mandate during the period from 16 March to 7 June 2017. It also presents the progress UNAMID has made in the implementation of its benchmarks and provides an update on the transfer of tasks to the United Nations Country Team and the development of an exit strategy for UNAMID.

II. Conflict dynamics and security situation

2. During the reporting period, the level of armed hostilities in Darfur remained significantly lower than in previous years. The non-signatory armed movements attempted to reassert their military presence in Darfur, but remained unable to conduct sustained operations in the face of the military dominance of the Government of the Sudan. In response to intercommunal conflict during the migration season, state and local governments and community leaders, supported by UNAMID, undertook preventive and mitigation measures, resulting in a lower level of violence as compared with previous years. However, the root causes of such disputes, as they relate to the ownership of and access to land and other resources, remained unresolved. Civilians and internally displaced persons were exposed to physical attacks, most often by armed militia and government security personnel. Despite an overall improvement in security conditions as compared with one year ago, the lack of significant progress towards effectively addressing the root causes and consequences of the conflict, especially with respect to the issue of land and presence of armed militias, prevented the further stabilization of the situation in Darfur.

Fighting between forces of the Government of the Sudan and armed movements

3. For the first time since the outbreak of the conflict in 2003, the annual dry season in Darfur witnessed only one major and a few minor military confrontations between government and armed movement forces in April and May. Having

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extended its unilateral ceasefire in January 2017 for a further six-month period, the Government did not relaunch its counter-insurgency campaign against the significantly weakened Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) in Jebel Marra this year. The Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) clashed with government forces in North and East Darfur.

4. Following military losses at the hands of the forces of the Government of the Sudan in Darfur in 2014 and 2015, as reported by the Panel of Experts on the Sudan (see S/2017/22), SLA/MM and JEM have maintained a presence and involvement in the conflicts in Libya and South Sudan. On 20 May, SLA/MM, with elements of the Sudan Liberation Army/Transitional Council (SLA/TC), a splinter faction of SLA/AW reported to have established tactical cooperation with SLA/MM, clashed with the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces in North and East Darfur for the first time in three years.

5. In North Darfur, on 20 May, SLA/MM and SLA/TC elements on board 280 gun-mounted and utility vehicles were intercepted by quickly mobilized SAF and Rapid Support Forces in Musbat and Wadi Howar (Furawiyah), approximately 60 km north-east and 120 km north of Umm Barru, North Darfur, near the border with Chad. Unable to sustain operations against government forces, the majority of armed movement elements were reportedly forced to retreat to Chad and Libya by 22 May. On 28 and 29 May, Government and SLA/MM forces also clashed in Ayn Sero, 30 km north-west of Kutum, North Darfur, reportedly resulting in at least three civilian fatalities, four incidents of rape, burning and looting of villages and civilian displacement. The Mission is verifying these reports.

6. Concurrently, in East Darfur, on 20 May, SLA/MM and SLA/TC forces on board 80 vehicles clashed with Sudanese Armed Forces in Sharaya, 70 km west of Ed Daein, East Darfur, resulting in the deaths of five Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers and an unconfirmed number of rebels. Further clashes were reported near the Adoula mountains and Arto Bargo, 25 km south and 16 km south-east of Shearia, respectively, on 21 and 22 May, resulting in the deaths of seven SLA/MM fighters and one Sudanese Armed Forces soldier. On 21 May, 15 men identifying themselves as SLA/MM members approached the Mission's team site in Muhajiryiah, East Darfur, and were subsequently arrested by Military Intelligence. By the end of 22 May, the Government confirmed that approximately 30-40 SLA/MM combatants with seven vehicles had managed to reach Jebel Marra via East Darfur. The majority of rebels, however, were reported to have retreated to South Sudan via Abu Jabra. UNAMID has received conflicting accounts of the total number of casualties in these incidents and has not received reports of civilians being affected.

7. The Government claimed to have captured at least 130 armed movement elements and 83 vehicles and confirmed the deaths of the Rapid Support Forces Deputy Commander, Colonel Hamdan al-Samih, during fighting in North Darfur. The SLA/TC commander and former SLA/AW deputy commander, Mohamed Adam Abdulsalam (Tarada) and several other SLA/MM and SLA/TC commanders, were also reportedly killed in the fighting. Government officials and the SLA/MM leadership exchanged public accusations with respect to the cause of the fighting and violations of their unilateral ceasefires, which JEM and SLA/MM had also renewed for six months on 3 May, and issued conflicting accounts regarding the impact. The Government accused the armed movements of launching a coordinated incursion from Libya and South Sudan into Darfur with the objective of undermining peace and stability and delaying the permanent revocation of United States Government sanctions which are scheduled for review in July 2017, as well as possibly re-establishing a military presence in the region after years of absence.

SLA/MM, in turn, claimed the fighting was caused by Government attacks on rebel-held areas, including through aerial bombardment in eastern Jebel Marra.

8. Meanwhile, as a result of the territorial losses suffered in 2016 and internal fracturing and defections, SLA/AW maintained only a limited military presence in the higher reaches of Jebel Marra in Killing, Boullay, Kibli, Bar Arie, Kalokitting, Kwila and Galol. Facing the closure of supply routes and logistical constraints, SLA/AW resorted to incursions and ambushes north of Kass, Deribat and Menawashei, South Darfur, areas in which government forces have not established full control. On 7 April, reportedly in search of supplies, SLA/AW ambushed a government police vehicle along the Keila-Al Malam road area between Menawashei and Deribat, killing two police officers and wounding one. On 7 May, according to local sources, Sudanese Armed Forces retaliated by attacking SLA/AW positions in Katti, Kurifal, Burro, Kadingo, Marra, Kwila, Boga and Barbara, within 20 km south and south-east of Guldo, Central Darfur. UNAMID was unable to verify the impact of the fighting owing to road conditions in the area.

9. Significant military setbacks over the past year and reported internal disagreements due to a lack of effective leadership on the ground resulted in further divisions within SLA/AW and the defection of its members. On 3 and 4 April, clashes between two groups within the movement were reported in Kaylah, 30 km north-west of Menawashei, resulting in the death of a local commander. On 14 April, the Governor of Central Darfur announced the signing of a peace agreement between the Government and a SLA/AW faction under the leadership of Abdel-Latif Abdel-Hamid in Zalingei, which was the third defection from the armed movement within six months.

Local conflicts and intercommunal violence

10. The reporting period, characterized by the ongoing migration season, witnessed 11 intercommunal security incidents resulting in 88 fatalities compared with 8 incidents and 45 fatalities during the previous period. The most significant clashes took place between Arab tribes over access to limited resources such as grazing pastures and water along migration routes. State and locality-level authorities, native administrations and community leaders, with the support of UNAMID, took expedient action to maintain security, mediate between the communities and initiate reconciliation processes. Such measures, many of which have been implemented since mid-2015, contributed to a decrease in the number of fatalities as compared with two years ago, which saw 278. Nonetheless, the sustainability of reconciliation and peace agreements remained a significant challenge in the absence of progress in resolving underlying issues over land ownership.

11. Two of the conflicts involved Salamat, a nomadic community without recognized land rights and competing over resources with Misseriya in Central Darfur, and Habbaniya and Ta'aisha in South Darfur. In South Darfur, fighting between Salamat and Habbaniya over the sharing of migration routes led to 28 deaths. Following a cattle-rustling incident, on 29 April, Salamat launched an attack on the Habbaniya village of Um Sial, west of Buram, to recover the stolen animals, to which Habbaniya responded in Nadeif on 8 May and in Sakhara on 10 May, west and south-west of Buram. Following the engagement of the State-level mediation committee, community leaders and UNAMID on 12 May in the presence of the Governor of South Darfur, the two communities agreed to cease hostilities and to convene a reconciliation conference in August 2017. The conference is expected to build on the previous agreement of 2009, which did not fully address the issue of land ownership and access in Al Nadeif.

12. In Central Darfur, following a cattle-rustling incident, Salamat and Misseriya clashed near Kabar, north of Um Dukhun, on 9 April, resulting in three fatalities. Despite Government efforts to stabilize the security situation, clashes over cattle-rustling and other crimes ensued in Umm Sory, south of Um Dukhun, on 16 May; in Magula, north-east of Um Dukhun, on 17 May; in Bir Bagara and Mogali, west of Bindisi, on 19 May; in Sure, north-east of Um Dukhun, on 20 May; in Murraya, east of Um Dukhun, on 21 May; and Salayle, south of Kabar, on 22 May. A total of 15 Misseriya and 24 Salamat were killed, with reports that the Misseriya burned down 10 Salamat-inhabited villages and that 716 households were displaced to Um Dukhun. Government forces reinforced their presence in the area, and the two communities agreed to cease hostilities at a meeting in Um Dukhun on 27 May. Meanwhile, a peaceful co-existence committee engaged both sides with a view to initiating a reconciliation process.

13. In East Darfur, tensions between Ma'aliya and Southern Rizeigat persisted. No further progress was reported in efforts to resolve their dispute over the ownership of land and oil in Abu Karinka and Adilla localities, with Ma'aliya maintaining their rejection of the draft Marawie agreement presented to the parties by the Government in 2015 and which grants land rights to the Southern Rizeigat, as the framework for the process. In this context, a series of cattle-rustling-related criminal incidents resulted in 21 fatalities and threatened to reignite the conflict. On 9 April, five Southern Rizeigat and four Ma'aliya, as well as two Government soldiers, were killed during clashes in Sabah al-Nima, south-west of Abu Karinka. Further clashes took place in Sabah al-Nima on 18 April, and in Okus, north-east of Muhajiriyah, on 7 May, resulting in four Ma'aliya and three Southern Rizeigat fatalities. In an effort to maintain security, government forces enforced the buffer zone established by the State Government in the wake of the fighting in 2015. Government police investigated but failed to apprehend the perpetrators, while community leaders urged both sides to treat these incidents as crimes and not an escalation of the broader conflict.

Violence against IDPs

14. As compared with the previous reporting period, there was a decrease in reported violence against internally displaced persons, with 104 criminal incidents, resulting in 22 fatalities, compared with 249 incidents and 31 fatalities previously. These crimes included violent attacks against internally displaced persons in or near camps and gathering sites, the killing of women and children, sexual and gender-based violence and abductions. Most often, the perpetrators were members of armed militias, the Rapid Support Forces, Border Guards and organized criminal groups.

15. Internally displaced persons were most vulnerable in Kutum, Tawilah, Korma, Kabkabiyah and Sortony in North Darfur, El Geneina and Kereinik in West Darfur, Zalingei and Nertiti in Central Darfur, and Nyala and Bulayl in South Darfur. In the North and Straha internally displaced person camps in Nertiti and Rwanda internally displaced person camp in Tawilah, internally displaced persons reported that attacks and harassment by armed men prevented them from farming in the area. At Otash camp in Nyala, criminality and attacks against internally displaced persons, especially women and girls, despite the presence of Government police in the camp, were reported.

16. In Sortony, North Darfur, despite the signing of a peace agreement with the Government in January 2017, the presence of former SLA/AW elements under the leadership of "General" Sadiq at the gathering site raised tensions with Fur internally displaced persons. The former rebels were reportedly engaged in the forcible recruitment of internally displaced person youth and attacks and harassment of internally displaced persons, calling for their return to their places of origin. On

22 March, the former rebels abducted two internally displaced persons from the site. They were subsequently released on 30 March following the intervention of UNAMID. On 27 April, the former rebels also clashed with Arab nomads over access to the Kube water point, north-west of the gathering site, resulting in the deaths of three nomads and one former rebel. SAF deployed reinforcements and facilitated an agreement between the two communities over access to the water point. The Government has yet, however, to ensure the removal of the former rebels from the internally displaced person gathering site and integrate them into the armed forces as stipulated in the agreement.

Crime and banditry

17. A total of 239 criminal incidents and 60 fatalities were recorded, compared with 673 criminal incidents and 106 fatalities during the previous period. The decrease is attributable to several Government security measures, including the increased use of Rapid Support Forces capacity to combat crime, the banning of the use of non-registered motorcycles, the use of facemasks and the carrying of arms by civilians. Incidents included assault and harassment (52 cases), shooting (30), murder (30), armed robbery (18), livestock theft (12), abductions (8), burglaries and break-ins (4), attempted robberies (4), attacks and ambushes (2) and other incidents (2).

18. Armed militia remained a threat to Government military and police personnel, with four incidents recorded, as was the also case during the previous period. In East Darfur, following an attempt to arrest an armed motorcyclist in Donki Kamal, west of El Daein, Government security personnel clashed with Rizeigat militia from 24 to 26 March, resulting in 15 security personnel fatalities and nine injured, including two civilians. In Central Darfur, following an ambush on the convoy of a locality commissioner in Chad earlier that day, Rizeigat militia, alleged members of Rapid Support Forces, clashed with Chadian security forces and Misseriya in Gaiya, west of Bindisi, Central Darfur, on 25 March. The fighting resulted in the deaths of four members of the Chadian troops and two Misseriya. On 14 May, armed Rizeigat clashed with South Sudan security forces along the border at Tuhama in Bahr al-Arab, East Darfur, reportedly resulting in 20 casualties among the security forces.

III. Political developments

Darfur peace process

19. During the reporting period, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP)-led mediation, supported by UNAMID and regional stakeholders, continued with efforts to convince the parties in Darfur to agree to a formal cessation of hostilities as a first step towards a political settlement of the conflict. However, further delays to the process by the armed movements in order to avoid a binding agreement, coupled with the Government's increased confidence due to its military dominance on the ground, have prevented any tangible results.

20. From 6 to 9 April, AUHIP, led by former President Thabo Mbeki, visited Khartoum and engaged with government officials and the Sudan-based opposition on the way forward in the talks on the cessation of hostilities and on ensuring an inclusive national dialogue. Citing the conclusion of the national dialogue process in October 2016, Government officials expressed the view that the negotiations should now focus solely on convincing those outside the process, in particular the Sudan Call coalition, to accept its outcome and join the Government of National Unity. The Sudan Call, in turn, highlighted the need for a meeting of the coalition to

adopt a unified position on the implementation of the Roadmap Agreement for Ending the Conflicts in Sudan, of 2016.

21. Given the deadlock, on 9 April, AU/HIP announced plans to hold consultations with opposition groups in Addis Ababa, to be followed by a meeting between the opposition and the National Dialogue High Implementation Committee, as the basis for determining the next steps in the peace process. On 11 April, the Sudan Call rejected discussion on the national dialogue prior to the conclusion of the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access agreements in Darfur and the Two Areas in accordance with the Roadmap Agreement. On 7 May, SLA/MM issued a press release calling for a new peace process which would address the root causes of the conflict and provide for greater participation of the European Union and countries neighbouring Sudan.

22. In the absence of progress in determining the next steps in the negotiations, on 18 and 19 May, the Government, JEM and SLA/MM held informal consultations in Berlin, facilitated by the Government of Germany, to discuss their main point of disagreement, namely the use of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as the framework for future talks. Notwithstanding the lack of a breakthrough, the parties committed to maintain dialogue. Meanwhile, according to media, SLA/AW, which remained outside the peace process, declined the invitation to Berlin and reiterated its rejection of any negotiations with the Government prior to the improvement of security conditions in Darfur, the disarmament of militias and compensation for internally displaced persons.

National dialogue

23. In line with the outcome of the national dialogue, on 11 May, the Prime Minister, Bakri Hassan Saleh, who was appointed by the President, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, in March 2017, announced the formation of a new government of national unity. The new government is composed of 31 ministers and 44 state ministers and has a mandate until 2020 to oversee the implementation of the recommendations of the national dialogue, which concluded in October 2016, including constitutional and economic reforms and national reconciliation. The number of ruling National Congress Party posts at the ministerial level was reduced from 18 to 12 (58 to 39 per cent) to accommodate the other participating groups. At the level of state ministries, the number of National Congress Party ministers was reduced from 23 to 17 (64 to 38 per cent). President al-Bashir also appointed 65 new members of the National Assembly representing the participants of the national dialogue, increasing the size of the legislature from 426 to 491 and decreasing the majority of the National Congress Party in the chamber from 83 to 65.8 per cent.

24. Two out of four federal ministers from Darfur, Bahar Idriss Abu Garda and Ahmed Babiker Nihar, retained their positions as, respectively, Minister of Health and Minister of Labour and Administrative Reforms. Leadership in two further ministries changed hands between officials from Darfur, with Abdul Karim Musa replacing Hayder Galokoma Ateim as Minister of Youth and Sports, and Bushara Aru replacing Musa Tebin Musa as Minister of Animal Resources. Mohamed Abdel Rahman Hassabo maintained his position as Vice-President, while Tijani al-Sisi, former chairperson of the Darfur Regional Authority, is no longer part of the Government. At the level of State Ministers, Darfuris retained their roles in the Ministries of the Presidency and Industry and the Council of Ministers, and gained representation in the Ministries of Decentralization and Transport.

25. Non-participating opposition groups, including members of the Sudan Call Coalition, denounced the formation of the new government in the absence of constitutional reform and in the context of the current political and human rights

environment. The National Umma Party stated that opposition participants had forsaken meaningful national reforms in exchange for government positions and the status quo. On 3 May, despite calls from participating opposition parties such as the Popular Congress Party for the completion of constitutional reforms prior to the formation of the new government, President al-Bashir extended the mandate of the commission tasked with leading this process for an additional year in order to complete its task. Disagreements were also reported between the National Congress Party and participating opposition parties prior to the decision of the National Assembly on 24 April to maintain the arresting and emergency powers of the National Intelligence and Security Services and to remove amendment proposals pertaining to fundamental freedoms.

IV. Humanitarian situation

26. In the past three months, humanitarian partners have verified 8,048 individuals newly displaced in Darfur during 2017. This included 7,554 individuals displaced as a result of intercommunal fighting in East Darfur to El Lait, North Darfur, in February and March, and 494 individuals displaced from central Jebel Marra to Hasahisa camp in Zalingei, Central Darfur, in January. In the absence of major armed hostilities during the current dry season, there was a significant decrease in displacement as compared with previous years, including 2016, during which approximately 158,000 people were newly displaced. The level of displacement following the fighting between government and rebel forces in May is currently being verified.

27. In April, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) resumed the verification of displaced persons in Tawilah and Sortony, North Darfur, which had been delayed by Government restrictions since February 2016. IOM also registered 10,229 new returnees in April, including 4,385 in Otash village, South Darfur, mainly from the Otash internally displaced person camp, and 5,844 returnees registered in nine localities in North Darfur, mainly from Chad and other locations in North Darfur. Water shortage remained a concern in Sortony during the dry season as boreholes had dried up owing to lower water tables. Elsewhere in Darfur, an estimated 3 million people, including 2.1 million internally displaced persons, remained in need of assistance.

V. Operating environment

Attacks and restrictions of movement on and denials of access to the Mission

28. During the reporting period, the level of security incidents affecting United Nations personnel and property decreased, with 18 criminal incidents recorded, compared with 50 in the previous period. These incidents included break-ins and theft (2), trespassing (2), carjacking (3), attempted carjacking (2), property damage (2), shooting (3) and other incidents (4). On 20 and 30 April, Military Intelligence detained three peacekeepers for allegedly taking pictures of the local SAF headquarters and being present in a restricted military area. All three peacekeepers were released immediately. On 28 May, a UNAMID national staff member was arrested by the National Intelligence and Security Services in Ed Daein for alleged corruption, while the Mission's national staff members arrested on 23 November 2016 remain in custody in Khartoum without charges.

29. On 31 May, unidentified armed gunmen carjacked a UNAMID vehicle with two peacekeepers in Nyala, South Darfur, killing one of them. The perpetrators fled the scene with the vehicle. The incident was the first UNAMID fatality since March

2016, and followed two similar carjacking incidents against humanitarian actors in the Nyala area in April and May 2017, as described below. UNAMID urged the Sudanese authorities to swiftly apprehend the perpetrators. The decrease in armed hostilities during the reporting period witnessed a corresponding decrease in restrictions on the Mission's ground movement with 5 cases being reported, compared with 13 during the previous period. The Government, however, continued to restrict the Mission's verification patrols to conflict-affected areas, including to Furawiyah, Musbat and Ayn Sero, North Darfur, in the aftermath of the recent fighting between forces of the Government of the Sudan and armed movement forces and in Buram, South Darfur, and Um Dukhun, Central Darfur, following clashes between Habbaniya and Salamat and Misseriya and Salamat, respectively. UNAMID did not experience any air movement restrictions, compared with 11 during the previous period. However, bureaucratic impediments challenged air mobility, including delays in the approval of flight schedules, prohibition of flights between team sites in different sectors and limits on air operation hours.

Access denials and restrictions imposed on humanitarian actors

30. With the issuance in December 2016 of new Government directives on humanitarian action, the operating environment has improved as compared with previous years. In addition to faster approval for movement within Darfur and fewer denials of access, humanitarian partners were also granted access to previously inaccessible areas such as Boori, Central Darfur, and Belle el Sereif, South Darfur. In April 2017, United Nations Humanitarian Air Service reactivated regular flights to Golo, Central Darfur, further facilitating the movement of humanitarian staff and supplies to the area. Needs assessment missions are being planned to Rockero, Central Darfur, and to Deribat, South Darfur, which has not been accessed since 2010, although both missions have been delayed due to security concerns. SLA/AW-held areas in Jebel Marra remained inaccessible. The inconsistent application of the new directives, however, has restricted travel clearance, approval of international non-governmental organizations' technical agreements, and the ability to select national implementing partners, and has resulted in frequent delays in the issuance of visas for humanitarian staff.

31. Humanitarian activities were also impacted owing to conditions of insecurity in certain areas. On 19 April, armed men carjacked an United Nations Humanitarian Air Service minibus driven by a national staff member in the Hay al-Muglis area of Nyala, South Darfur. The driver was released by the perpetrators on the Nyala-El Fasher road after being robbed of his personal belongings. On 3 May, armed men in military attire on board a Toyota Land Cruiser vehicle attempted to carjack a minibus belonging to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees near the World Food Programme warehouse in Nyala. The perpetrators fled the scene following the intervention of UNAMID troops escorting the vehicle. No casualties were reported.

Visas and customs clearances

32. The Government granted 292 visas for UNAMID, which included 132 for military and police personnel, 74 for contractors and 18 for international staff. As of 27 May, 476 visa requests submitted since January 2016 remained pending, including 155 for police, 104 for contractors, 85 for official visitors, 62 for military personnel, 58 for civilian staff and 10 for United Nations Volunteers. No additional visas were granted for the Human Rights Section, which has a vacancy rate of 46 per cent, while the overall vacancy rate for Mission civilian staff is 13 per cent, of which 6.5 per cent is attributable to pending visas.

33. The Sudanese authorities have released food ration containers progressively as they arrive at Port Sudan. However, customs clearances for 112 shipments (for the previous quarter, the number was 182) of contingent and United Nations-owned equipment remain pending, some since April 2015. These shipments include armoured personnel carriers and vehicles, communications and information technology equipment, generators, submersible pumps and spare parts for vehicles. The delays resulted in demurrage charges and other costs incurred by troop- and police-contributing countries associated with the inspection and repair of equipment. In addition, the Government has not granted the certificate of exemption from taxation for goods imported by sea in 2016. The request for the same certificate for 2017 was submitted on 7 November 2016 and is still pending approval.

VI. Mandate implementation

A. Support for an inclusive peace process

High-level mediation

34. In support of the AUHIP mediation, the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur engaged with the armed movements to seek their views on the way forward in the Darfur peace process and particularly with respect to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as the framework for further discussions. During their meeting with the Joint Special Representative in Paris on 1 May, the leadership of JEM and SLA/MM presented a document outlining procedural and substantive areas on which they would like to engage with the Government, the latter being a reiteration of their previous position with respect to the Doha Document, including the need to address the root causes and key consequences of the conflict. The Joint Special Representative called on JEM and SLA/MM to demonstrate goodwill with respect to the possible resumption of direct talks, after which the two armed movements extended their unilateral cessation of hostilities on 3 May. On 2 May in Paris, the Joint Special Representative also met with the leader of SLA/AW, who undertook to consider the possibility of joining the negotiations process.

Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

35. Following the dissolution of the Darfur Regional Authority in September 2016, UNAMID engaged the Government of the Sudan on the need to complete the restructuring process necessary for the operation of the remaining five commissions and one fund of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. During the reporting period, the Government worked on drafting terms of reference and planning necessary budget and staffing allocations and reporting lines for those institutions. In April 2017, the Mission held consultations with State Governments on the status of the Doha Document for implementation. The consultations revealed that delays in the restructuring process have also delayed the work of the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission and the Darfur Land Commission, while the Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund and the newly established Commission for the Development of Pastoralists and Nomads remained non-operational in Darfur.

36. On 14 May, in collaboration with the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNAMID launched a two-week demobilization process targeting 500 ex-combatants in El Geneina, West Darfur. Funding gaps delayed the provision of reintegration

assistance for 2,000 of the 5,738 ex-combatants who have been demobilized since 2014. On 10 April, the Mission signed memorandums of understanding with implementing partners for 21 community stabilization projects that will target 800 direct beneficiaries in East, West, North and Central Darfur and promote skills training, infrastructure development and livelihood and agricultural support.

37. Following a three-month delay owing to financial reporting issues in the previous phase, the roll-out of the remaining 10 locality consultations in the third phase of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation resumed in East Darfur, in Bahr al-Arab, on 9 and 10 April, and El Ferdous, on 16 and 17 April, with approximately 200 local participants. Consultations were also held in Tawilah, on 16 and 17 May, and Kornoi, on 22 and 23 May, in North Darfur. Participants highlighted the need for basic services and infrastructure and the empowerment of women and children in efforts to resolve intercommunal conflict and selected participants for the next state-level round of consultations.

B. Protection of civilians

38. UNAMID commenced the roll-out of its refined protection of civilians strategy in mid-April. In order to enhance early warning and response capacity, UNAMID integrated field protection teams carried out 26 missions to remote locations in Central, North and West Darfur. The teams consulted with local communities and assessed current protection threats, which highlighted insecurity, particularly for women and girls undertaking livelihood activities, as well as the risk posed by small arms, tensions between farmers and pastoralists and crop destruction during the harvest season, and the limited capacity of local police to address these issues.

Provision of physical protection

39. UNAMID conducted a total of 22,519 patrols, including 8,572 short-range patrols, 520 long-range patrols and 2,639 night patrols, consisting of 5,868 visits to villages and 2,531 to camps for internally displaced persons. Police personnel conducted 7,385 patrols, including 3,499 confidence-building patrols to such camps and 3,886 patrols responding to security needs, in particular those of women and children engaged in livelihood activities such as firewood and water collection. UNAMID also conducted 453 joint patrols with 1,115 community policing volunteers in camps for internally displaced persons.

40. With the outbreak of clashes between Government and armed movement forces in mid-May, UNAMID deployed verification patrols to locations west of Um Baru (Tine and Kornoi), west of Kutum (Disa and Anka), and Musbat and Furawiya, North Darfur, to assess the situation and verify the impact on civilians. In East Darfur, UNAMID military and police patrols were deployed to Muhajiriyah, Shearia and Labado. UNAMID was not granted access to Ayn Sero, North Darfur, the area reportedly most affected by the fighting. UNAMID also implemented a contingency plan, in coordination with the United Nations country team, with particular emphasis on engaging the Sudanese authorities to allow the opening of a humanitarian corridor for displaced civilians from Ayn Sero to safe areas and to facilitate the pre-positioning of basic supplies. The Mission also engaged with the parties to immediately cease hostilities and the Government to treat all prisoners of war in accordance with international humanitarian law. In response to the intercommunal clashes in Buram, South Darfur, the Mission conducted a verification patrol and intensified regular patrols in, Buram and Nadeif areas in order to monitor the status of the cessation of hostilities between the communities.

41. The Mission provided round-the-clock protection for internally displaced persons at the Sortony gathering site and Tawilah camp in North Darfur and stepped up its confidence-building patrols in Nertiti, Central Darfur, Kalma and Kass, South Darfur, and Kabkabiyah, North Darfur, further to reports of attacks on and harassment of internally displaced persons. In Sortony, North Darfur, UNAMID advocated for the resolution of the disputes between Fur who had been internally displaced, former SLA/AW elements and Northern Rizeigat nomads. In this regard, the Mission facilitated the return of five community leaders from among the internally displaced persons who sought protection at the Mission's team site to the gathering site for internally displaced persons and engaged the Government, calling for the integration into government forces of the former rebels. UNAMID also engaged with internally displaced persons and nomads to ease tensions over access to the Kube water point and requested the Government's intervention to resolve the dispute over the security incidents which had occurred between them since May 2016 and for the opening of the Kabkabiyah-Sortony road, which remained blocked by the nomads.

Logistical and security support to humanitarian operations

42. UNAMID provided 364 round-trip escorts for United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, civil society and humanitarian partners, in support of the delivery and monitoring of humanitarian assistance and assessment missions, including 46 escorts by formed police units and the prepositioning of humanitarian assistance to the Mission team sites in anticipation of the rainy season. In addition, UNAMID provided regular armed escorts for the movement of humanitarian personnel between Sortony and Kabkabiyah, North Darfur.

Promoting a protective environment

43. UNAMID documented 82 new cases of human rights violations and abuses involving 124 victims, including 15 children, during the reporting period, compared with 181 cases involving 400 victims during the previous. UNAMID confirmed 60 cases involving 77 victims. The remaining 22 cases involving 47 victims could not be verified owing to various factors, including access restrictions. Violations of the right to life accounted for 24 cases involving 40 victims, and violations of the right to physical integrity accounted for 31 cases involving 52 victims. There were 17 reported cases of sexual violence in the form of rape and attempted rape involving 17 victims, including 13 children, of which 9 concerned sexual and gender-based violence, while 8 concerned conflict-related sexual violence. There were six cases of arbitrary arrest and illegal detention involving nine victims, and four abduction cases involving six victims. Of the 82 reported cases, 16 cases involving 22 victims were reportedly perpetrated by government security forces and associated groups. The remaining 66 cases, involving 108 victims, were allegedly perpetrated by unidentified armed men, some described by victims as being Arabs.

44. On 29 March and 29 April, respectively, the Mission engaged with the newly appointed Attorney-General and the new Director-General of Prisons and Reform, who pledged their support in strengthening the capacity of justice actors. In an effort to strengthen the juvenile justice system in Darfur, on 27 April, UNAMID and UNICEF completed a newly constructed family and child court in Zalingei, Central Darfur, in the context of quick-impact projects. The Mission monitored the trial by the Special Prosecutor for Darfur Crimes of two Arab defendants accused of the murder of Masalit and Tama tribesmen in incidents which took place in West Darfur on 24 November and 26 December 2016, respectively.

45. UNAMID conducted training on human rights, prison operations, community policing, criminal investigation and evidence collection, crowd-control management,

identification of explosive remnants of war and small arms and light weapons control and computer skills that benefited 268 male and 1 female government police officers. The Mission supported the establishment of nine security coordination forums in which the government police, UNAMID, international non-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and community leaders exchanged information on protection needs. UNAMID also held 14 training courses on community policing, peer counselling, human rights and road safety awareness for 441 male and 196 female internally displaced person community policing volunteers and one workshop on gender equality, gender mainstreaming and sexual exploitation and abuse benefiting 36 male and 44 female internally displaced persons. UNAMID trained prosecutors and police investigators on investigation techniques and new prison officers on human rights and prison management.

46. The Mission raised awareness on child rights and child protection through sensitization campaigns and the provision of training to 1,353 local beneficiaries and 387 male and 966 female prison officials. Communities were also sensitized on the dangers of child labour, early marriage and unexploded ordnance. UNAMID supported the establishment of child protection committees in Habila, Al Riyadh, Al Khairant and Forobaranga localities, in West Darfur. On 16 March, the Mission launched an awareness-raising campaign in Habila against child recruitment and the use of child soldiers.

47. On 27 March, the United Nations Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting, together with the Government of the Sudan, extended the Action Plan for the Protection of Children from Violations in Armed Conflict for six months, which will allow the completion of the identification and screening of children, complaint procedure for communities, and awareness-raising activities. As a follow-up to the meeting with JEM and SLA/MM in Geneva in November 2016, the Task Force co-chairs attended a workshop organized in Entebbe, Uganda, on 27 and 28 April, with the support of Sweden and Canada.

48. The Mission deployed explosive remnants of war disposal and risk education teams throughout Darfur with particular focus on newly accessed areas within and adjacent to Jebel Marra. The teams conducted general explosive hazard assessment and disposal operations in 98 villages throughout Darfur, resulting in the identification of 91 hazard areas and the destruction of 1,412 items of unexploded ordnance. UNAMID also delivered mine risk awareness training benefiting 43,002 individuals, including 24,828 adults and 18,174 children. The Mission assisted the Government with the disposal of 47,363 rounds of small arms ammunition in Sereif, North Darfur, and Tamar, Central Darfur. On 24 April, in Forobaranga, West Darfur, UNAMID, the National Mine Action Centre and the Governor of West Darfur celebrated the clearance of all reported explosive remnants of war in the locality, making it the first locality in Darfur to achieve this status.

49. In coordination with the Government and the United Nations country team, UNAMID worked on developing innovative and sustainable ways to facilitate the reintegration of returnees and create conducive conditions in their places of origin. For example, following the peace agreement signed between the communities in Shattaya, South Darfur, in August 2016, the Mission supported the re-establishment of security and rule of law institutions in the locality, with the construction of a local court, prosecutor's office and police stations, as well as livelihood projects for over 400 returnee families. On 6 May, the Deputy Joint Special Representative (Protection) and the Governor of South Darfur launched a livelihood community stabilization project in Shattaya.

50. During the reporting period, the Mission implemented 68 quick-impact projects and 26 community stabilization projects across Darfur, aimed at supporting

community-led, socioeconomic development and local governance structures. The projects ranged from ensuring access to water to training on the production of fuel-efficient stoves to allow internally displaced women to reduce the time spent collecting water and firewood.

C. Local conflict mediation

51. In accordance with its strategy to address intercommunal conflict, UNAMID implemented measures to prevent, mitigate and address the root causes of the fighting. As part of its conflict prevention efforts, UNAMID engaged with internally displaced persons and community leaders through community alert networks, confidence-building patrols and field assessment missions to assess key protection concerns particularly as they relate to the criminal activities of militia, including land occupation and the denial of access to farmland. In anticipation of the upcoming farming season, in collaboration with UNDP, UNAMID conducted dialogue forums between nomads and farmers in Habila, West Darfur, Mukjar and Um Dukhun, Central Darfur, and Kutum and Waha, North Darfur, at which were discussed the importance of adherence to rules governing migration and farming and for local and state Government support in this regard.

52. In order to contain the impact of ongoing conflicts, UNAMID deployed confidence-building patrols to Buram and Nadief, South Darfur, and Um Dukhun, Central Darfur. The Mission urged the Government to ensure security and support community leaders and native administrations in the cessation of hostilities and reconciliation processes. In Buram and Nadief, UNAMID facilitated the work of community advisory councils, resulting in the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement and agreement to initiate a reconciliation process between Habbaniya and Salamat. UNAMID engaged the South Darfur state government to undertake more long-term measures to sustain peace, such as enhancing the rule-of-law situation, disarmament and legislative reform on land management.

53. In East Darfur, while continuing to urge state authorities to move forward with the peace process between Ma'aliya and Southern Rizeigat, UNAMID supported the implementation of mechanisms which have, over the past year, successfully prevented a further escalation of conflict between the two sides. Specifically, the Mission engaged the authorities and community leaders to maintain the security buffer zone between the two communities, as both a security and early warning mechanism, to ensure that perpetrators of cattle-rustling are brought to justice and for the two communities to maintain their dialogue with respect to the resolution of and compensation for such crimes.

54. As part of its support to reconciliation efforts, on 15 May, in collaboration with the Governor of West Darfur, the Sultan of the Masalit and UNDP, UNAMID facilitated a conference on peaceful coexistence, the purpose of which was to discuss the status of community relations between Masalit and the various Arab communities that had given rise to the fighting in Umtajok, Mouli and Azerni in 2016. Participating communities called on the Government to undertake the necessary legislative reform to strengthen the role of native administrations, underlined the need for implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and social engagement between local communities. On 24 May, the Mission and the Kabkabiyah Prevention and Conflict Management Committee, led by community leaders, held a reconciliation meeting between Northern Rizeigat and Fur in Kabkabiyah, North Darfur, to discuss the situation in Sortony. As a possible first step towards resolving their dispute, the two sides agreed to establish a committee to determine compensation required for the killing of six Fur internally displaced persons in May 2016.

VII. Transfer of mandated tasks to the United Nations country team and exit strategy

A. Transfer of mandated tasks and cooperation with the United Nations country team

55. UNAMID and the United Nations country team are in the process of finalizing the Integrated Strategic Framework for 2017-2019. In accordance with the mandate of the Mission, the Framework priority areas will be durable solutions, the rule of law and restoration of State authority and peacebuilding for human security. It will also incorporate United Nations country team planning based on the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the Humanitarian Response Plan.

56. During the period under review, the Government of Canada approved the allocation of funding of $961,391 to implement projects by UNAMID, UNDP and UNICEF under the Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur. Given the existing resource and capacity constraints of the United Nations country team, UNAMID, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the United Nations Fund for Population Activities and UNDP explored further areas of transition and opportunities for resource mobilization in the area of gender. The Mission's Gender Affairs Advisory Unit provided technical support to UN-Women and the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Sudan in the development of a national action plan on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.

B. Exit strategy

57. Further to Security Council resolution 2296 (2016) and the communiqués of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 13 June 2016 and 29 March 2017, the United Nations and the African Union engaged in discussions with the Government of the Sudan on the implementation of the UNAMID benchmarks as the basis of the exit strategy. During the most recent meeting of the Joint Working Group, held in Khartoum on 20 April, the African Union and the United Nations briefed the Government of the Sudan on the preliminary findings of the joint strategic review of UNAMID, which was conducted from 5 to 17 March 2017. On 22 May 2017, a strategic-level meeting of the Tripartite Mechanism was held in Khartoum during which the report of the meeting of the Joint Working Group held on 26 February 2017 was endorsed. The Tripartite Mechanism also took note of the recommendations of the AU-United Nations strategic review report (S/2017/437). The Government, the African Union and the United Nations further encouraged the technical-level meeting of the Tripartite Mechanism to resume its monthly meetings on operational issues, while the Government reiterated its commitment to work constructively with UNAMID in this regard, including through the early release of shipments, issuance of visas and provision of timely access.

VIII. Financial aspects

58. The General Assembly, by its resolution 70/284, appropriated the amount of $1,039.6 million for the maintenance of UNAMID for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017. As at 17 May 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNAMID amounted to $81.7 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,613.5 million. Reimbursement of troop and formed police costs has been made

for the period up to 31 January 2017, while reimbursement for the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 December 2016, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IX. Observations

59. The situation in Darfur has evolved. For the first time in 14 years of conflict, the annual dry season witnessed only one major military confrontation between Government and armed movement forces. Noteworthy efforts have been made, particularly by State and local governments in Darfur, in cooperation with native administration and community leaders and with the support of UNAMID, to prevent and mitigate intercommunal conflict.

60. Despite these significant improvements, many of the crucial grievances that caused the conflict and its consequences still need to be addressed, together with their consequences. Civilians in Darfur remain exposed to attacks and harassment, human rights violations and abuses, and sexual and gender-based violence, committed by armed militia, government forces and armed movements, as well as intercommunal violence resulting primarily from unresolved disputes over land and other resources. The absence of conditions such as security, basic services and the resolution of land ownership disputes remains an obstacle to the voluntary and dignified return of internally displaced persons.

61. There is an urgent need for concrete progress on the conclusion of a formal cessation of hostilities agreement. While taking note of the recent positive discussions the armed movements held with the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur, Jeremiah Kingsley Mamabolo, in Paris and with the Government of the Sudan in Berlin, I urge the Government and armed movements to cease fighting and to recommit to their unilateral ceasefires, demonstrate the requisite goodwill and political vision and flexibility and move the negotiating process forward in accordance with the Roadmap Agreement of 2016 and within the framework of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. I further reiterate my call to the SLA/AW leadership to desist from any actions that could destabilize the situation in Darfur and to join the peace process without preconditions or further delay. I urge the Government and former SLA/AW factions that have signed peace agreements to abide by and implement their provisions, with a view to delivering the peace dividends expected by the people of Darfur.

62. The national dialogue process remains a unique platform for the Sudan to address its internal political challenges. I take note of the progress made in the implementation of its recommendations and the establishment of the national unity government. I call upon the Government and the opposition to continue with efforts towards achieving the compromises necessary to ensure that this important process is fully inclusive and reflects the views and desires of all Sudanese citizens.

63. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur is central to our joint efforts to achieve long-term and sustainable solutions for the Darfur conflict. It is therefore necessary to move forward with the implementation of its provisions, in particular those relating to the root causes and consequences of the conflict on issues such as land, the disarmament of militias, reconciliation and accountability and the return of internally displaced persons. UNAMID stands ready to support the Government of the Sudan in taking the necessary steps to ensure the effective functioning of the remaining Doha Document for Peace in Darfur institutions. I further call upon the Government of the Sudan to accelerate its efforts to ensure the effective presence of law enforcement and judicial institutions throughout Darfur and to honour its responsibility to disarm all militias.

64. The significant decrease in the rate of new displacement in 2017 is a positive development. A total of 2.7 million people, however, remain displaced in Darfur, with another 300,000 refugees in Chad. UNAMID, as well as the United Nations country team, are committed to working with the Darfur state governments on developing comprehensive peace stabilization plans for local areas that are most important for the creation of durable solutions for displaced populations, and to support the Government in creating conditions conducive to the reduction of abuses against the civilian population. In this context, I would join the call of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, as expressed in its 673rd meeting, on 29 March 2017, for the international community to continue to provide much-needed support, with a view to alleviating the dire situation faced by the vulnerable and affected populations in Darfur.

65. I welcome the positive discussions held in the past three months among the Government of the Sudan, the African Union and the United Nations on an exit strategy for UNAMID. Together with our partners in the African Union, we will continue to work closely with the Government of the Sudan on the implementation of this process, on the basis of the mandate of the Mission and benchmarks as defined by the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

66. In maintaining this spirit of cooperation, I call upon the Government of the Sudan to work with the Mission to fully abide by its obligations under the status-of-forces agreement and remove all outstanding operational restrictions on effective mandate implementation, including through granting access to conflict areas, issuing visas for all substantive civilian staff, in particular human rights personnel, and providing customs clearance for military and police equipment at Port Sudan.

67. Since its deployment in 2007, UNAMID has contributed greatly to the stabilization of the security situation in Darfur and the protection of civilians. In the context of rapidly changing circumstances in Darfur, however, it is necessary for the Mission to adjust to the current needs on the ground. I would therefore reiterate the recommendations for the reconfiguration of UNAMID as presented in my joint report of 18 May 2017 with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (S/2017/437), including with respect to the extension of the mandate of UNAMID for a further 12 months.

68. In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur and Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator, Mr. Mamabolo, the Mission leadership and all the personnel of UNAMID, the United Nations country team and humanitarian partners who continue to work tirelessly towards the pursuit of sustainable peace in Darfur in often very difficult conditions. I also wish to commend my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan, Nicholas Haysom, and former Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Abdulsalami Abubakar of AUHIP for their steadfast commitment to sustainable peace and stability in the Sudan.



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